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Developments in Newfoundland and
Labrador Offshore Royalties: From
Hibernia to Hebron and Back

This paper traces the historical development of the offshore oil and gas royalty
regime for Newfoundland and Labrador, from the first negotiated private royalty
agreement for the Hibernia project, through the application of both generic and
project-specific regulatory schemes applicable to later projects, up to the Hibernia
Southern Expansion. The variations in key provisions across the six major projects
are reviewed, with regard to royalty structures, transportation cost eligibility, cost
and production allocation, dispute settlement and legislative stability clauses.
Finally, the prospect for application of innovations and solutions developed to
date to future projects is considered.

L'article retrace Ihistoire du d6veloppement du regime de redevances sur les
hydrocarbures de la r~gion extracti~re pour Terre-Neuve-et-Labrador depuis la
premiere entente de redevances ndgocide pour le projet Hibernia; pour ce faire,
ilexamine I'application de r~gimes reglementaires g6ndriques et de rdgimes
rdglementaires sp~cifiques aux plus r6cents projets jusqu'J I'extension sud du
r6servoirHibernia. Les diff6rences entre les dispositions cl~s des six principaux
projets sont pass6es en revue aux chapitres des structures de redevances, de
I'admissibilitedes frais de transport, de I'allocationdes coots et de la production,
du reglement des diff~rends et de la stabilit6 Idgislative. Enfin, les auteurs
examinent la possibilite d'appliquer a de futurs projets les innovations et les
solutions 6labor6esjusqu'! maintenant.
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1. Background
The jurisdictional disputes between Canada and the Province of
Newfoundland and Labrador (the Province) with respect to the
Newfoundland and Labrador offshore area (the offshore area) have been
chronicled elsewhere.' Under the current statutory scheme in the Canada
-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord ImplementationAct' (the FederalAccord
Act), and the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord
Implementation Newfoundland and LabradorAct3 (the ProvincialAccord
Act and, collectively with the Federal Accord Act, the Accord Acts), the
Federal Accord Act imposes royalties on petroleum produced from the
offshore area. The history of the negotiation and the nature of the Accord
Acts has been discussed previously.' For our purposes it is sufficient to
note that the Accord Acts constitute "mirror" legislation by Canada and

1. See Shawn Denstedt & RJ (Jack) Thrasher, "The AccordActs Twenty Years Later" (2007) 30 Dal
LJ 287 at 288-289 and authorities referenced there.
2.
Canada-Newfoundland Atlantic Accord Implementation Act, SC 1987" c 3 [Federal AccordAct].
3. Canada-Nevfoundland and Labrador Atlantic Accord Implementation Newfoundland and
Labrador Act, RSNL 1990, c C-2 [Provincial Accord Act].
4.
For a more detailed discussion of the framework and operation of the AccordActs see Dendstedt
& Thrasher, supra note 1 at 289-293.
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the Province that creates a joint management regime for the exploration,
*development, and production of petroleum from the offshore area.
1. Legislation
Section 97(2) of the Federal Accord Act reserves, and makes "each
holder of a share in a production licence" in the offshore area liable to
pay, to the federal Crown the "royalties.. .that would be payable in respect
of petroleum under the [Newfoundland and Labrador] Petroleum and
Natural Gas Act5 if the petroleum were produced from areas within the
Province. '6 Section 97(4) of the FederalAccord Act makes the Petroleum
and Natural Gas Act (the P&NG Act) and any regulations made under the
P&NG Act apply to the offshore area and any references in the P&NG Act
to the provincial Crown are deemed to be references to the federal Crown.7
Part II of the P&NG Act deals with royalties. There are two ways to
impose royalties under Part 11: (1) by regulation; and (2) by an agreement
made by the Province under section 33 of the P&NG Act, which agreement
prevails over regulations made under Part II where the agreement is
inconsistent with those regulations.8 Part II was amended extensively
in 2001.9 Section 47 of the P&NG Act provides that "leases issued after
April 1, 1990" are subject to these amended royalty provisions, but that
leases issued before April 1, 1990 are subject to the royalty "provisions...
in force...before the..." amendments came into effect."
Production Licence 1001 (PL1001), which comprises the Hibemia
Development Project (Hibernia), was issued on 21 March 1990 and is the
only production licence issued on or before 1 April 1990. Accordingly,
PL1001 is subject to the provisions in the P&NG Act as they read before
the 2001 amendments. All subsequent production licences issued in
Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, RSNL 1990, c P-10 [P&NG Act].
Federal Accord Act, supra note 2, s 97(2).
lbid, s 97(4)(a).
The relevant provisions of the P&NG Act, supra note 5, are ss 32 and 33:
Royalty share
32 Petroleum produced under a lease is subject to and an interest holder is liable for and
shall pay royalty share to the Crown in an amount and in a manner prescribed by regulation.
Royalty agreement
33 (1) The Lieutenant-Governor in Council may make an agreement with an interest
holder, with one or more holders of shares in a lease or with another person, including an
agreement that is inconsistent with regulations made under this Part.
(2) Where an agreement made under subsection (1) is inconsistent with regulations made
under this Part the agreement shall prevail.
9. See An Act to Amend the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act, SNL 2001, c 41.
10. -The term "lease" in the Oil Royalty Regulations must be interpreted by reference to s 30 of the
pre-amendment P&NG Act. This provision states that for royalty purposes, "lease" includes a similar
instrument issued under the Provincial Accord Act, supra note 3, which would include a production
licence. P&NG Act, supra note 5, s 47.
5.
6.
7.
8.
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respect of the offshore area will be subject to the royalty provisions in the
P&NG Act as they read after the 2001 amendments (and any subsequent
amendments).
2. Hibernia
Every premier of Newfoundland and Labrador since its joining
Confederation attended the signing ceremony for Hibernia on 7 November
1990. It was a singular moment in the Province's history and ushered in a
new era in its economic status." Discovered in 1979, the Hibernia oil field
is located in the Jeanne d'Arc Basin which underlies the northeast portion
of the Grand Banks approximately 315 kilometers east southeast of St.
John's in eighty metres of water. 2 The field contains approximately 1.395
billion barrels 3 of recoverable resource and is the fifth largest oil field

11. For. an interesting discussion of the effects of the oil and gas industry on the economy of
the Province up to 2007 see Wade Locke, "Offshore Oil and Gas: Is Newfoundland and Labrador
Getting its Fair Share?" (2007) 99:3 Newfoundland Quarterly 8. See also the discussion of the
benefits received by the Province from oil and gas development in Government of Newfoundland and
Labrador, Developing an Energy Planfor Nevfoundland and Labrador: Public discussion paper (St.
John's: Department of Natural Resources, 2005), online: <http://www.nr.gov.nl.ca/nr/energy/plan/pdf/
discussionpaper.pdf> at 1.
12. Like the Atlantic Accord itself, the financial assistance arrangements reached to proceed with
the Hibernia project, despite low oil prices and other challenges, were a unique product of federalprovincial co-operation. Canada provided a variety of financial assistance measures including a
$1.66 billion primary guarantee facility to assist in financing for the project, a $1.04 billion federal
contribution to the eligible costs of the project, a $175 million temporary financing facility to assist
with cost overruns or if a proponent's cash flow after debt service was negative after production startup, and a $300 million interest assistance loan facility to assist with interest payments in times of
low oil prices. Canada took project security in respect of the obligations of the proponents under the
primary guarantee facility and an option on a net profits interest in the project. The Province provided
$95 million in contributions relating to costs of the construction site at Bull Ann and $11 million in
contributions for the gravity base structure construction in the Province as well as a commitment that,
subject to each proponent maintaining a permanent establishment in the Province or the offshore area
and allocating wages and salaries as agreed, the proponents' taxable income from the project would
be taxed at the lesser of the provincial rate or the average of the rates of the other provinces and
territories. For an analysis of the multiplier effects of the government assistance to Hibernia see James
P Feehan & L Wade Locke, "Multiplier Effects and Governments Assistance to Energy Megaprojects:
An Application to Hibernia" (1993) 5:1 Energy Studies'Review 38, online: <http://digitalcommons.
mcmaster.ca/ esr/vol5/iss 1/3>.
13. This is the Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board's (C-NLOPB)
figure for proven and probable reserves as of 1 September 2011. See Canada-Newfoundland and
Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board, "Petroleum Reserves and Resources Newfoundland Offshore
Area" online: Canada-Newfoundland Petroleum Board <http://www.cnlopb.nl.ca/pdfs/disc-rr.pdf>.
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discovered in Canada. 4 Hibernia utilizes a massive gravity base structure
(GBS) that sits on the ocean floor, is designed to withstand iceberg impacts,
and contains facilities for production operations from the field.
Despite the elaborate structure negotiated and enacted in relation to the
Accord Acts, the first royalty relating to a petroleum development in the
offshore area was not entirely of that lineage. In the negotiations leading
to the execution of the HiberniaDevelopment ProjectRoyalty Agreement
(the HRA), it was concluded that the royalty arrangements between the
Province and the Hibernia proponents should be reflected in a so-called
"private" royalty agreement-a binding contract between the province and
the Hibernia proponents. 15 The Hibernia royalty is thus in large measure
based upon a contract between the Province and the Hibernia proponents.
Canada is not a party to the HRA and the agreement expressly states that
it has not been entered into pursuant to any provision of the Accord Acts
and has not been entered into pursuant to subsection 25(1)16 or any other
provision of the P&NGAct.

14. The original proponents of Hibernia were Mobil Oil Canada Properties (now ExxonMobil
Canada Properties) (28.125%), Chevron Canada Resources (21.875%), Petro-Canada Hibemia
Partnership (25%) and Gulf Canada Limited (25%). Hibernia is operated by Hibemia Management
and Development Company Ltd (HMDC), which is owned by the Hibernia proponents in the same
proportions as their working interests in Hibernia. Gulf announced its withdrawal from Hibernia in
1991. Following intensive efforts by the other proponents and the federal and provincial governments,
the Gulf interest was acquired by the three other original proponents and the following working
interests were conveyed by them to Mobil Canada Hibernia Ltd, an affiliate of Mobil Canada Ltd
(5%), Chevron Hibernia Holding Company Ltd, an affiliate of Chevron Canada Resources (5%),
Murphy Atlantic Offshore Oil Company Limited (6.5%), and Canada Hibernia Holding Corporation
(8.5%). Canada Hibernia Holding Corporation (CHHC) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Canada
Development Investment Corporation (CDIC), a federal Crown corporation. CHHC was established
inMarch 1993, for the sole purpose of holding, managing, administering, and operating Canada's
8.5% working interest in Hibernia.
In 1997, Petro-Canada and Norsk Hydro Canada Limited entered into a swap arrangement with
respect to various North Sea and offshore area properties as a result of which Norsk Hydro Canada
Limited (now Statoil Canada Ltd) acquired a five per cent interest in Hibernia.
15. The Province took security for the proponents' royalty obligations under the HRA and registered
that security, together with a copy of the HRA, in the Registry of Deeds in St. Johns where it was publicly
available for many years. Given the changes in the Province's registry system, it is not clear whether
it is still available from that source. Hibernia Development Project (Canada), HiberniaDevelopment
Project Royalty Agreement (16 February 2010), online: Department of Natural Resources <www.
nr.gov.nl.ca/nr/eneigy/petroleum/offshore/projects/hibernia royaltyamending agreement.pdf>
[HRA]. For a general discussion of contracts with a provincial crown see Peter W Hogg & Patrick J
Monahan, Liabilityof the Crown, 3d ed (Scarborough: Carswell, 2000). For a review of the Province's
position on the various fiscal regimes negotiated with respect to the offshore are up to Hebron see
Leah Fusco, "Offshore Oil: An Overview of Development in Newfoundland and Labrador," online:
Memorial University of Newfoundland <http://www.ucs.mun.ca-oilpower/documents/NL%20oil%20
7-25-I .pdf>.
16. The predecessor to s33(i) of the current P&NG Act, supra note 5.
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Given that the HRA was not entered into pursuant to the Accord Acts
or the P&NG Act, there was a royalty enacted in respect of Hibernia under
the P&NG Act that would, in effect, "occupy the field" in relation to the
structure under the AccordActs. The relevant regulations under the P&NG
Act 7 (the Oil Royalty Regulations) provide that each holder of a share in
a lease issued under the P&NG Act before 1 April 1990 (as noted, only
PL1001 falls into this category) must "pay to the [provincial] Crown a
basic royalty... of $0.01 for each barrel of petroleum produced under the
lease to which that holder... is entitled."' 8 Under Sections 97(2) and 97(4)
of the Federal Accord Act, this royalty is payable to the federal Crown.
Petroleum produced from lands subject to PL1001 is therefore subject to
the $0.01 per barrel basic royalty under the Oil Royalty Regulations,which
is credited against the royalties payable to the Province under the HRA. 19
3. Terra Nova
The next major offshore development in the offshore area after Hibemia
was the Terra Nova Development Project (Terra Nova). The Terra Nova oil
field was discovered in 1984 and is located approximately 350 kilometres
east southeast of St. John's at a water depth of ninety to one hundred
metres. 20 The field is estimated to contain over one billion barrels of oil
in place, of which an estimated 419 million barrels are recoverable. Terra
Nova was developed with a floating production, storage, and offloading
vessel (an FPSO).
The history of the Terra Nova negotiations on the fiscal arrangements
with the Province has been described elsewhere. 2' Despite several years of
negotiations and an advanced document in the form of a private agreement
along the lines of the HRA, there proved to be intractable differences
between the parties on certain issues and the Province proceeded to enact
a set of generic regulations in the form of the Newfoundland and Labrador

17. See CNLR 22/96 [Oil Royalty Regulations] and its predecessors, NLR 231/90 and NLR 264/90.
18. See Oil Royalty Regulations, ibid,s 3(1).
19. HRA, supranote 15, ss 1.3 & 24.15.
20. Suncor Energy Inc (formerly Petro-Canada) is the majority interest holder (33.99%) and operator
of Terra Nova with the other interest holders being ExxonMobil Canada Properties (22%), Husky Oil
Operations Ltd (12.5 1%), Murphy Oil Company Ltd (12%), Mosbacher Operating Ltd (3.5%), Statoil
Canada Ltd (15%) and Chevron Canada Resources (1%). The very different approach to government
assistance in Terra Nova and the consequent effects in terms of the work required to construct the
facilities used in Terra Nova is described in Fusco, supra note 15 at 5-6. The estimated oil reserve
figure given is the C-NLOPB's figure for proven and probable reserves as of I September 2011, see
Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board, supranote 13.
21. See RJ (Jack) Thrasher, "Newfoundland Generic Royalty Regime" (2003) 26 Dal LJ 365 at 366367 and authorities referenced there.
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Royalty Regulations, 2003 (the Generic Royalty Regulations)22 to apply
to Terra Nova and other post-Hibernia projects such as the White Rose
Development Project (White Rose).
The Generic Royalty Regulations cannot impose a royalty payment
directly in respect of the offshore area which is outside the legislative
jurisdiction of the Province. 23 The Generic Royalty Regulations can,
however, provide the basis for the calculation of a royalty payable to
Canada in accordance with sections 97(2) and (4) of the Federal Accord
Act.
As certain issues had been resolved in the Terra Nova negotiations in
a different manner from the treatment of those issues under the Generic
Royalty Regulations,there is a Part XIII in the GenericRoyalty Regulations
that applies only to Terra Nova. 24 The Generic Royalty Regulations other
than Part XIII apply to White Rose.
4. White Rose
White Rose is located on the eastern margin of the Jeanne d'Arc Basin,
approximately 350 kilometres east of St. John's and within 50 kilometres
of Hibernia and Terra Nova. The field is comprised of the North, West,
and South Avalon pools. 25 The initial development focused on the South
Avalon Pool in a water depth of 120 metres. Total recoverable oil reserves
are estimated at 270 million barrels. White Rose was also developed with
an FPSO.
5. White Rose expansion
The White Rose Expansion or White Rose Growth Project includes the
North Amethyst Field, West White Rose, and South White Rose Extension.
Nalcor Energy-Oil and Gas Inc (Nalcor), a wholly-owned subsidiary of

22. Royalty Regulations, 2003 under the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act [Generic Royalty
Regulations], NLR 71/03 [Royalty Regulations]. For one view of the purpose of the generic royalty
regime see Fusco, supra note 15 at 9.
23. See Reference Re Newfoundland ContinentalShelf, [1984] 1 SCR 86.
24. Royalty Regulations, supra note 22: these Terra Nova specific provisions include an extended
period before the minister can exercise lien rights under s 20(4), the basic (s 73) and incremental
(s 74) royalty rates applicable to Terra Nova, the Tier I and Tier II return allowance factors (s 75),
provisions for deduction of basic royalty in calculating Tier II royalty payable in periods after Tier II
payout when Tier I royalty is not payable (s 76), different cost limits for arm's length provisions (s
77), different fair market value levels for capital lease treatment (s 78), pre-development costs (s 79),
additional Tier II return allowance (s 80), reference price provisions for sales of oil not at arm's length
(ss 81-83), payable date for payment of overpayments (s 84), special disallowed cost rules (s 85), and
an independent expert procedure for resolution of eligible cost disputes (s 86).
25. Husky Oil Operations Ltd is the majority interest holder (72.5%) and operator of White Rose
with the other interest holder being Suncor Energy Inc (27.5%).
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the Province's energy corporation, Nalcor Energy Inc, has a five per cent
interest in the White Rose Growth Project.
North Amethyst is the first satellite field development at White Rose
and was brought on production on 31 May 2009. It is also the first subsea
tie-back project in Canada. It is estimated to hold 67.9 million barrels of
recoverable oil.
6. Hebron
The Hebron Development Project (Hebron) has also had an interesting
history. First discovered by Norcen Energy in 1981, it is the second largest
26
resource to proceed to development in the offshore area after Hibernia.
Its reserves are a heavier quality of crude than found in Hibernia, Terra
Nova, or White Rose that is technically more complex to recover and less
profitable to develop, and in 2002 the development process for Hebron
was suspended because of low oil prices.27 At one point consideration was
given to a pipeline to transport the Hebron crude to market, but that did
not proceed. 28 The proponents are planning to use a GBS to produce from
Hebron.
The initial phase of the Hebron negotiations with the Province was
not successful. The Hebron proponents disbanded their project team in
April 2006 and indicated they would not proceed with the development of
Hebron at that time. 29 Premier Danny Williams indicated that the Province
would require a 4.9% equity interest and a super-royalty in relation to
Hebron and that the Province would pursue the acquisition of the interest
of ExxonMobil (whom the Premier blamed for the failure to proceed with
26. Estimated recoverable reserves in Hebron are 400-700 million barrels of oil. Norcen Energy's
interest was acquired by Chevron Canada Resources, which had a 28% interest and became the operator
of Hebron despite the larger 37.9% interest held by ExxonMobil Canada Properties. The other parties
were Petro-Canada (now Suncor Energy Inc) with a 23.9% interest and Norsk Hydro Canada (now
Statoil Canada Ltd) with a 10.2% interest. On 22 August 2008, Chevron Canada Resources announced
that it was relinquishing its operatorship of Hebron, which was assumed by ExxonMobil Canada
effective 1 October 2008. See Chevron Corporation, "Chevron in Canada: Hebron Project Update,"
online: Chevron Corporation <http://www.chevron.ca/news/releases/2008-08_hebronupdate.asp>.
27. See Fusco, supranote 15 at 10.
28. See Brent Jang, "Chevron mulls undersea pipeline to revive Hebron oil project," The Globe and
Mail (9 June 2004).
29. See Chevron Corporation, "Chevron Announces Plans to Suspend Hebron Activities" (3 April
2006), online: The. Sir Robert Bond Papers <http://bondpapers.blogspot.com/2006/04/chevronannounces-plans-to-suspend.html>; James Stevenson, "Hebron Partners Suspend Heavy Oil Project
in North Atlantic," Resource Investor (3 April 2006), online: Summit Business Media <http://www.
resourceinvestor.com/News/2006/4/Pages/Hebron-Partners-Suspend-Heavy-Oil- Project-in-North.
aspx>; "Hebron project 'over', partner Chevron says," The National Post (12 April 2006), online:
PostmediaNetwork Inc <http://www.canada.com/nationalpost/ financialpost/story.html?id=ed4d9140a208-4acb-ab4a-c312069ed0b0&k=6294>. For one view of the reason for the breakdown in the
Hebron negotiations and the negative effects the Province's position on Hebron had on the investment
climate in the offshore area at the time see Fusco, supranote 15 at 10-11.
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the development) or perhaps fallow field legislation to ensure development
on a timely basis if the proponents did not proceed with the development
of Hebron. 30 The joint management regime in the offshore area under
the Accord Acts means, however, that any such legislation would require
federal action to implement and the federal government never publicly
expressed any interest in pursuing such a course.
About the same time as the Hebron negotiations were unravelling, the
Hibernia proponents submitted an application to the Canada-Newfoundland
and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board (C-NLOPB) in relation to an
amendment to the Hibernia development plan that would permit them
to drill and develop lands in the southern portion of PL1001 as well as
additional lands further to the south and subject to production licence
1005 (PL1005) and exploration licence 1093 (EL1093). The C-NLOPB
released a decision in January 2007 approving the application, subject to
certain conditions. An approval of an amendment to a development plan is
a fundamental decision under the Accord Acts, however, and requires the
approval of both the federal and the provincial ministers. 31 By letter to the
C-NLOPB dated 17 January 2007, the Minister of Natural Resources for
the Province indicated that she did not approve of the C-NLOPB's decision
as she did not have enough information. The Chairman and CEO of the
C-NLOPB responded with a letter to the Minister dated 31 January 2007
and the Minister replied with her own letter of 2 February 2007 expressing
her disappointment with the January 3 1"letter.32
Following the refusal by the provincial minister to approve the
C-NLOPB's decision, negotiations with the Province on the fiscal
regime for Hebron resumed in the spring of 2007. The parties concluded
a memorandum of understanding dated 21 August 2007 (the Hebron

30. The Province had also proposed a requirement that an oil refinery be built in Newfoundland and
Labrador that was later dropped. For a discussion of the policy and legal considerations of fallow fields
initiatives in the East Coast offshore see Raymond E Quesnel, "Fallow Fields Initiatives and Canada's
East Coast Offshore: Policy and Legal Considerations" (2007) 30 Dal LJ 457.
31. See FederalAccordAct, supra note 2, ss 31(1), 31(2), 139.
32. The first letter written by the Minister of Natural Resources can be found online: Government
of Newfoundland and Labrador <http://www.releases.gov.nl.ca/releases/2007/nr/letterjan]7.pdf>..
The. response to the Minister's letter by the Chairman and CEO of the C-NLOPB is discussed in
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, "Hibernia South Decision Should Not Delay Approvals"
(2 February 2007), online: Government of Newfoundland and Labrador <http://www.releases. gov.
nl.ca/releases/2007/nr/0202n I l.htm>. The subsequent letter from the Minister of Natural Resources
in response can be found online: Government of Newfoundland and Labrador <http://www.releases.
gov.nl.ca/releases /2007/nr/0202letter.pdf>.
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MOU) 33 that contemplated, among other matters, the acquisition of a 4.9%
equity interest in the Hebron project by the Province through its energy
corporation and an additional royalty of 6.5% payable on net revenues
after Tier I payout if the monthly average West Texas Intermediate (WTI)
prices exceed $50 (US) per barrel.
In September 2007, the Province released its energy plan: Focusing
Our Energy--Newfoundland and Labrador Energy Plan.3 4 The Energy
Plan included proposals for both the acquisition of equity interests in
future projects in the offshore area (ten per cent was the suggested interest)
and a fiscal regime, including royalties, that was described in the Energy
Plan as providing an "appropriate sharing of the downside risk" and "the
upside potential, as well as clarity to potential investors."35
Following publication of the Energy Plan, the Province and the Hebron
proponents continued to negotiate the Hebron fiscal arrangements, which
were entered into on 20 August 2008. The Hebron fiscal arrangements
mark an interesting intersection of the different approaches to royalties in
the offshore area. The Hebron MOU contemplated a number of features
that were a departure from the Generic Royalty Regulations. It was agreed
that these features would be reflected in an agreement pursuant to section
33 of the P&NG Act that would be entered into between the Province and
the Hebron proponents, including Nalcor. On 20 August 2008, the Province
and the Hebron proponents entered into the Hebron Fiscal Agreement
33. See Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, "Equity, Improved Royalty Regime and
Outstanding Local Benefits Highlights of Memorandum of Understanding for Hebron Development"
(22 August 2007), online: Government of Newfoundland and Labrador <http://www.releases.gov.
nl.ca/releases/2007/exec/0822n02.htm>.
34. Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, Department of Natural Resources, (St. John's, NL:
Department of Natural Resources, 2007), online: Department of Natural Resources <www.nr.gov.nl.ca/
nr/energy/plan/pdf/energy~report.pdf> [Focusingour Energy]. The Province had long chafed under
the fact that the formula for federal-provincial equalization arrangements existing at the time Hibernia
began producing took offshore oil revenues into account, with the result that what the Province gained
from those oil revenues reduced what it would otherwise be entitled to in equalization payments. Like
many of the achievements of the Province in recent years this was a lengthy battle, beginning with
approaches by Premier Williams to Prime Minister Paul Martin in late 2003 and culminating with the
announcement of the changes to redress this effect on 31 January 2005. Under the new arrangements
contained in a sixteen year agreement between Canada and the Province, Canada agreed to make
payments to the Province to offset reductions in equalization payments resulting from offshore oil
revenues received by the Province. See Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, "Atlantic Accord
2005 News Releases" (14 February 2005), online: Department of Natural Resources <http://www.
nr.gov.nl.ca/energyplan/EnergyReport.pdf>. See also Government of Newfoundland and Labrador,
"Atlantic Accord 2005," online: Government of Newfoundland and Labrador <http://www.gov.nl.ca/
atlanticaccord/>.
35. See Focusing Our Energy, supra note 34 at 18. What is a fair share is a notoriously difficult
issue for energy producing provinces. For a 2007 discussion of the considerations relevant to the
application of the fair share "test" and Newfoundland and Labrador's "government-take" compared to
then comparables in other jurisdictions see Locke, supranote 11 at 10- 11.
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(HFA) which expressly provides that it is an agreement pursuant to section
36
33 of the P&NG Act.
As noted, section 33 contemplates agreements by the Province with
interest holders that are inconsistent with the Generic Royalty Regulations
and stipulates that such agreements prevail over those regulations (and
over any other regulations under Part II of the P&NG Act) where they are
inconsistent.37 The HFA provides that the Generic Royalty Regulations, as
modified by the HFA, apply to Hebron and the Hebron proponents. The
two major modifications made to the Generic Royalty Regulations by the
HFA are: (i) the GenericRoyalty Regulationsapplicable under the HFA are
those that existed on 16 August 2007; and (ii) such version of the Generic
Royalty Regulations is modified in accordance with the HFA. To the extent
the HFA is inconsistent with the GenericRoyalty Regulations as they exist
from time to time in the future, the HFA prevails.
Since the HFA is an agreement under section 33 of the P&NG Act,
if the P&NG Act applied directly to Hebron the royalty payable to the
Province would be calculated in accordance with the Generic Royalty
Regulations, as modified by the HFA. As a result, the royalty payable to
Canada in respect of Hebron under sections 97(2) and (4) of the Federal
Accord Act is calculated by reference to the Generic Royalty Regulations,
as modified by the HFA. To comply with sections 97(2) and (4) of the
FederalAccord Act, the royalty calculated in accordance with the HFA
must be paid to Canada rather than to the Province. As with Terra Nova
and White Rose, there was no need for a separate statutory royalty payable
to Canada (such as the Oil Royalty Regulations) as that role was fulfilled
by the Generic Royalty Regulations, as modified by the HF in the case
of Hebron.
7. HiberniaSouthern Extension
The Hibernia Southern Extension Project (HSE) is an expansion of the
Hibernia field that contains an estimated 215 million barrels of oil. An
estimated 167 million barrels will be produced using a subsea tie-back and
the remainder will be produced from the existing Hibernia GBS.3 s
Negotiations on the royalties applicable to HSE accelerated following
the execution of the HFA and the other Hebron agreements. These
36. See Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, Hebron Fiscal Agreement (20 August 2008),
online: Department of Natural Resources <http://www.nr.gov.nl.ca/nr/energy/petroteum/offshore/
projects/hebron fiscal aggre.pdf'> at 4.1 [HFA], and P&NG Act, supranote 5, s 33.
37. Supra note.22.
38. See Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board, "Staff Analysis: Hibernia
Development Plan Amendment" (2 September 2010), online: C-NLOPB <http://www.cnlopb.nl.ca/
news/pdfs/hibsadev.pdf> at 26.
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negotiations related to certain blocks in the southern portion of PL1001
that are entirely within PL 1001 (the AA Blocks) and additional lands that
underlie PL1001, PL1005, and EL1093 (the HSE Lands). The AA Blocks
will be drilled and produced from the existing Hibernia gravity base
structure while the HSE Lands will be drilled from both the Hibernia GBS
and semi-submersible drilling rigs and will be produced using a subsea
tie-back to the GBS.3 9 The Province and the HSE proponents agreed that
it would be preferable for all parties if all of the licences associated with
Hibernia (PL 1001, PL 1005, and EL 1093) were subject to the same royalty
regime so that the calculation, payment and administration of royalties in
respect of PL1001, PL1005 and EL1093 would be consistent in similar
circumstances." 4 ° With PLI001 subject to the HRA and PL1005 and
EL 1093 subject to the GenericRoyalty Regulations (as both licences were
issued after 1 April 1990), this was not an easy task to accomplish.
As noted, the HRA is a private contract and expressly not entered into
pursuant to any statutory provisions. On 16 February 2010, the Province
and the Hibernia proponents (including Nalcor as the holder of the
Province's equity interest in the HSE Lands) entered into an amendment to
the HRA to provide for a new royalty structure in respect of the AA Blocks
and that portion of the HSE Lands wholly contained within PL1001. As
this new royalty structure is contained within the HRA, which remains a
private contract between the Province and the Hibernia proponents, the
new royalties prescribed in respect of such lands are payable directly to
the Province in the same manner as all other royalties payable -pursuant to
the HRA.
The HRA only applies to PL 1001, however, so the Province and the
HSE proponents had to determine how to proceed with respect to that
portion of the HSE Lands that are not contained within. Rather than
entering into a new private contract with respect to PL1005 and EL1093
(in the same manner as the HRA with respect to PL 1001, and which would
have also likely required an expansion or duplication of the Oil Royalty
Regulations so as to occupy the field for PL 1005 and EL 1093 as was done
for PL 1001), the Province and the HSE proponents agreed to proceed in a
manner somewhat similar to what was done for Hebron. On 16 February
2010, the Province and the HSE proponents (again including Nalcor as
the holder of the Province's equity interest in PL1005 and EL1093) also

39. lbid at 19-39.
40. Hibemia Development Project (Canada), Hibernia Development Project EL1093/PL1005
Royalty Agreement (St. John's, NL: Department of Natural Resources, 2010) s 1.2(a) [ELRA], online:
Department of Natural Resources <http://www.nr.gov.nl.ca>.
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entered into the Hibernia Development Project EL1093/PL1005 Royalty
Agreement (the ELRA) to provide for the royalty structure in respect of the
external licences included in the HSE Lands-PL 1005 and EL 1093.
As with the HFA, the ELRA is an agreement entered into pursuant
to section 33 of the P&NG Act. Unlike the HFA, which provides that
the Generic Royalty Regulations, as modified by the HFA, will apply to
Hebron, the ELRA takes a different approach. The parties to the ELRA
agreed that the ELRA "comprehensively addresses the calculation,
payment and administration [of] royalties in respect of.. .PL005 and
EL1093," is entered into pursuant to section 33(1) of the P&NG Act and
is "inconsistent with the [Generic] Royalty Regulations... or any other
regulation[s] promulgated [pursuant to] Part II of the [P&NG] Act."'" As
the ELRA was modelled on the HRA and the terms and conditions of the
two agreements closely mirror each other, all of the Hibernia licences
(PL1001, PL1005, and EL1093) are now subject to fundamentally the
same royalty regime, even though PL1001 is subject to a private contract
and PL 1005 and EL 1093 are subject to an agreement -(that is expressly.
inconsistent with the Generic Royalty Regulations)pursuant to section 33
of the P&NG Act.
As a result, there are now six separate royalty regimes in the offshore
area: (1) the private contract regime for Hibernia (including the AA Blocks
and the portion of the HSE Lands that underlie PL 1001) operating outside
the Accord Acts as embodied in the HRA as amended in connection with
HSE; (2) the Oil Royalty Regulations imposing the $0.01 per barrel basic
royalty for Hibernia under the P&NGAct and "picked up" under the Federal
AccordAct; (3) for Terra Nova, the GenericRoyalty Regulationsincluding
the Terra Nova specific provisions in Part XIII; (4) for White Rose, the
Generic Royalty Regulations excluding the provisions in Part XIII; (5) for
Hebron, the combination of the GenericRoyalty Regulations and a project
specific agreement entered into pursuant to section 33 of the P&NG Act
that crystallizes and modifies the GenericRoyalty Regulations and prevails
over the GenericRoyalty Regulations and any other regulations under Part
II of the P&NG Act to the extent of any inconsistency; and (6) for the
portion of the HSE Lands that underlie PL 1005 and EL 1093, a section 33
agreement that supersedes the Generic Royalty Regulations and any other
regulations promulgated pursuant to Part II of the P&NG Act.

41.

Ibids 1.2(b), (c) and (d).
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It. Developments in Newfoundland and Lqbradoroffshore royalties
This section reviews the evolution of the royalty regime in the offshore
area from the original Hibernia regime, through Terra Nova and White
Rose, the publication of the Energy Plan and the entering into force of the
HFA, and finally back to Hibernia with HSE. Specifically, this discussion
focuses on key aspects of the. royalty regime that have undergone
significant changes in the course of that evolution: (i) the structure and
characteristics of the royalties payable; (ii) the eligibility criteria for
transportation costs to be deductible for royalty purposes; (iii) provisions
that allocate costs and production between separate projects that make
use of common infrastructure; (iv) dispute resolution provisions; and (v)
legislative stability provisions.
1. Royalty structures
Hibernia
As noted, Canada, the Province and the Hibernia proponents agreed on
a royalty regime for Hibernia that employed a combination of statutory
and contractual royalties. A royalty of $0.01 per barrel of crude oil is
prescribed by the Oil Royalty Regulations pursuant to the P&NG Act and
became effective in respect of Hibemia under sections 97(2) and 97(4).of
the FederalAccordAct.42 This statutory royalty is paid to Canada pursuant
to the Federal Accord Act and remitted to the Province. In addition, the
Hibernia proponents pay contractual royalties to the Province pursuant
to the HRA, which credits the statutory royalty paid to Canada under the
Oil Royalty Regulations against the contractual royalties payable to the
Province under the HRA.
The original HRA includes a three tier royalty structure in relation to
Hibernia: (i) gross royalty; (ii) net royalty; and (iii) supplementary royalty.
Gross royalty was the only royalty payable in the early years of Hibernia
and escalated during such time from an initial rate of one per cent up
to a maximum rate of five per cent. The original HRA provided that the
maximum rate of five per cent would be achieved seventy-two months
after production start-up, but the HRA was amended in 1999 to provide
that the maximum rate of five per cent would be payable from the earlier
of March 2004 or the time that Hibernia had produced 268 million barrels

42. See now CNRL 22/96 and its predecessors NL 231/90 and NL 264/90. NL 231/90 took a broader
approach to the statutory royalty referring to the basic royalty as a gross royalty between one per
cent and five per cent and an incremental royalty consisting of a net royalty of thirty per cent and a
supplementary royalty of 12.5%, in each case to be calculated and paid in the time and manner ordered
by the minister.
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of crude oil.43 Gross royalty is payable on the gross revenue of a proponent
generated from the sale of crude oil produced by such proponent from
Hibernia. No deductions for capital or operating costs or expenses are
permitted in the calculation of gross royalty, although the HRA does allow
for certain transportation related costs and expenses to be deducted in
44
calculating gross revenue.
Net royalty is the second tier of the Hibernia royalty structure.
Generally speaking, net royalty at the rate of thirty per cent of net
revenue (being the gross revenue and incidental revenue less a number
of eligible costs, which include capital and operating costs, but do not
include borrowing or financing costs, overhead of a proponent, certain
taxes, and other disallowed costs) is payable by a proponent following the
first time (net royalty payout) when the gross revenue of such proponent
exceeds the aggregate of: (i) the amount of such proponent's eligible costs
and expenses (including pre-development costs) compounded monthly at
a rate of fifteen per cent per annum (referred to as "return allowance");
plus (ii) the amount of any gross royalty paid by such proponent. The net
royalty return allowance is a form of return on investment allowed to the
proponents that provides for a yearly return of fifteen per cent on the amount
by which the net royalty cumulative eligible costs and expenses exceeds
cumulative gross revenue. If eligible costs exceed revenues during any
royalty period after net royalty payout, any excess will be carried forward,
without net royalty return allowance, as an eligible cost and credited in the
calculation of royalties in the subsequent royalty period. In any royalty
period following net royalty payout, the gross royalty paid plus net royalty
paid will not exceed the greater of five per cent of gross revenue or thirty
per cent of net revenue.
Supplementary royalty is the third tier and is largely the same structure
as net royalty, but the rate is 12.5% (over and above the thirty per cent net
royalty) of net revenue and the return allowance rate is eighteen per cent
per annum adjusted for changes in the Consumer PriceIndex for Canada
(All Items). Any eligible costs in excess of revenues in a period may be
carried forward in a manner identical to that for the net royalty. If no net
royalty is payable in a royalty period, the gross royalty paid is deducted

43. See the discussion of the Amending Agreement dated 1 September 1999 in Denstedt &
Thrasher, supra note I at 329-330. For a suggestion that the handling and eventual resolution of this
use actually led to a better royalty regime see Edward Hollett, "Hibernia spat led to better royalty
regime" (30 January 2007), online: The Sir Robert Bond Papers <http://bondpapers.blogspot.com/
search?q=Hibernia+Spat>.
44. See the "Transportationcost eligibility"section below for further discussion regarding deductible
transportation costs.
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from net revenue for the calculation of the supplementary royalty for that
period.
Terra Nova
The royalty structure under the Generic Royalty Regulations is similar
to the structure of the royalties payable under the BRA and consists of
a basic royalty and a two-tier incremental royalty payable separately by
each interest holder in a production licence, although the royalty rates and
return allowance factors differ between the HRA and the Generic Royalty
Regulations. For Terra Nova, Part XIII of the Generic Royalty Regulations
provides a basic royalty rate of one to ten per cent of gross revenue
depending on the aggregate volume of the interest holder's share of oil
transferred at the loading point and whether simple payout or basic royalty
payout had occurred, 45 and an incremental royalty in two tiers of thirty
per cent and 12.5%, respectively. The basic royalty under the Generic
Royalty Regulations is calculated on the interest holder's gross revenue
for the month, which is its gross sales revenue minus certain eligible
transportation costs under Part IX of the Generic Royalty Regulations.
The Tier I and Tier II incremental royalties are calculated on the interest
holder's net revenue, which is calculated in substantially the same manner
as net revenue under the HRA. Payout and royalty payment obligations
for the purposes of the incremental royalties under the Generic Royalty
Regulations are calculated in a manner substantially similar to the net
royalty and supplementary royalties under HRA.
White Rose
For White Rose and any other production licences issued after the Terra
Nova production licences on 20 November 2001, the basic royalty rate
under the Generic Royalty Regulations varies from one per cent to 7.5%
and the incremental royalty rates are twenty per cent for Tier I and ten per
cent for Tier II.
Hebron
Pursuant to the Energy Plan published after the entering into of the Hebron
MOU, the Province sought to achieve a maximum royalty rate of fifty
per cent with respect to any new projects in the offshore area. While

45. Simple payout occurs for an interest holder under a lease when its cumulative revenues exceed
cumulative eligible costs and basic royalty paid, excluding any paid in kind. Basic royalty payout for
an interest holder occurs when the sum of cumulative gross revenue and incidental revenue equals the
sum of cumulative eligible costs, basic royalty return allowance and basic royalty paid, excluding any
paid in kind. The basic royalty return allowance rate is calculated by a formula based on the long-term
government bond rate.
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the royalty regime in respect of the Hebron project does not include a
maximum royalty rate of fifty per cent, it does mark the introduction of the
so called "super-royalty," referred to in the HFA by the more pedestrian
term "additional royalty," to the standard royalty structure applicable to
the other projects in the offshore area.
Unlike the standard royalties (the gross royalty, net royalty and
supplementary royalty under the HRA and the basic and the incremental
Tier I and Tier II royalties under the Generic Royalty Regulations), the
Hebron additional royalty is price sensitive-the 6.5% additional royalty
is only payable for a month after Tier I payout when the arithmetic average
of the price of crude oil for each day of that month is greater than US$50.00/
oil barrel (bbl). The determination of the price of crude oil for each day is
based on the average range of prices of a marker crude (WTI light sweet
crude oil) as published in Platt's Crude Oil Marketwire for such day.4 6
A price-sensitive royalty serves to bridge the gap between competing
concerns of government and the proponents of a project-greater royalty
revenue on the part of government and the economic viability of the
project on the part of the proponents. In the Hebron context, the additional
royalty delivers increased royalty revenue to the Province in a highprice environment without burdening the project with increased royalty
obligations in a low-price environment when the economics of a project
are least able to cope with increased royalty obligations. The Hebron
basic royalty structure also provided that the basic royalty rate would not
increase above one per cent until simple royalty payout had occurred. 47
White Rose Expansion
The basic royalty and the Tier I and Tier II incremental royalties payable in
relation to oil produced from the White Rose Expansion are those payable
under the Generic Royalty Regulations excluding Part XIII. There is also
an additional royalty of 6.5% of net revenue payable any time after Tier I
payout when WTI crude oil trades above US $50 per barrel (not adjusted
for inflation).
46. The WTI Price used for Hebron under the HFA is based on the average of the specified range of
prices per barrel of WTI light sweet crude oil in US dollars, published in Platt's Crude Oil Marketwire.
If Platt's Marketwire is no longer available, it is the specified price per barrel of such crude oil set
forth in any successor publication widely used and generally accepted in the international petroleum
industry. If there is no such price or publication, it is the price for comparable quality light sweet
crude oil selected by the minister as a reasonable replacement in terms of quality and market for WTI,
and notified to the proponents, subject to arbitration if the Hebron proponents disagree. See Generic
Royalty Regulations,supranote 22, s 11.1, for the purpose of Hebron by paragraph (M) of Exhibit "C"
to the HFA.
47. This was seen by the Province as downside protection-the basic royalty rate would not exceed
one per cent until the proponent had recouped its costs.
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HSE
Although HSE followed shortly after Hebron, the general royalty structure
applicable to the AA Blocks and the HSE Lands is virtually identical to
the royalty structure provided for under the original HRA. Indeed, the
AA Blocks and that portion of the HSE Lands contained within PLI001
are subject to the HRA and have the same gross, net and supplementary
royalties as are applicable to the rest of Hibernia. That portion of the HSE
Lands contained within PL1005 and EL1093 are subject to the ELRA, but"
as discussed above the HRA and the ELRA are largely the same and so these
HSE Lands also have the same gross, net and supplementary royalties.
One important point, however, is that PL1005 and EL1093 are a separate
project from Hibemia and, therefore, net royalty and supplementary
royalty payouts (and the consequent payment of net and supplementary
royalties) are calculated independently for PL1001, on the one hand, and
for PL1005 and EL 1093 on the other.
In addition to the general Hibernia royalty structure, HSE also includes
additional royalties for certain portions of PL 1001 and for PL 1005 and
EL 1093 .4 Unlike Hebron, however, which has a uniform additional royalty
rate and price. trigger for all lands included within the Hebron project,
different additional royalty rates and royalty triggers apply to different
portions of the HSE Lands as well as the AA Blocks:
" the AA Blocks have an additional royalty, the rate of which, rather
than being dependent on a price trigger, varies depending on whether
a particular proponent is paying supplementary royalty in respect
of production from the AA Blocks-if a proponent is not paying
supplementary royalty the additional royalty rate is 12.5% and if the
proponent is paying supplementary royalty then the additional royalty
rate is 7.5%;
* the portions ofPL 1001 included within HSE have an additional royalty
that is both price sensitive and dependent on whether a proponent is
paying supplementary royalty:
if a proponent is not paying supplementary royalty, the additional
royalty rate is 7.5% at prices equal to or greater than US$50.00/
bbl but less than US$70.00/bbl and 12.5% at prices equal to or
greater than US$70.00/bbl; and

48. A well as the additional royalties, the AA Blocks and the HSE Lands are subject to the royalty
structure described above in relation to the HRA, although PLI005 and EL1093 are ring-fenced
sepaiately from PL 1001 for the purposes of calculating royalty obligations.
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if a proponent is paying supplementary royalty, the additional
royalty rate is 7.5% at prices equal to or greater than US$50.00/
bbl; and
PLI005 and EL1093 have an additional royalty that is solely price
sensitive-2.5% at prices equal to or greater than US$50.00/bbl -but
less than US$70.00/bbl and 7.5% at prices equal to or greater than
49
US$70.00/bbl .

This complexity reflects the competing objectives of government and
proponents with respect to additional royalties. A price-sensitive additional
royalty is intended to deliver increased value to government when prices are
high without compromising the project when prices are low. The varying
royalty triggers and additional royalty rates described above are reflective
of the differing economics of the development of various portions of the
lands included within HSE, and such economics are in turn impacted by
the traditional royalty structures applicable to such lands. Whether lands
are more or less likely to become subject to a supplementary royalty
obligation (and if so at what point in the development and exploitation
of the lands) is significant when attempting to forecast the economic
performance of a project and consequently determine and agree what
additional royalty obligation such project can bear. In the offshore area,
such additional royalty rates have been the subject of direct negotiations
between the Province and the proponents of a project. The rates are agreed
on a case-by-case basis and vary from project to project based on the
economic viability of the project in question.
By comparison, Alberta has separate royalty regimes for oil sands
and conventional oil. Price sensitivity features were introduced into
these royalty regimes by the government of Alberta throughout the 1970s
and 1980s. These features were implemented as a response to changing
conditions in the industry "[i]n an [attempt] to level the 'playing field"'
and recover a greater share of revenue from Alberta's resources. 0
Alberta's current oil sands royalty regime is similar to that under the
original HRA in that it provides for an initial gross royalty as well as a net
royalty once a project achieves net revenue payout. As in Newfoundland
and Labrador, this gross royalty is always payable; the concept of net
revenue payout marks the commencement of net royalties, but following

49. The maximum royalty rate payable in respect of any lands included with HSE is fifty per cent
when including net royalty, supplementary royalty and additional royalty.
50. Alberta Energy, Energy Economics: Understanding Royalties (Edmonton: Alberta Energy,
2009), online: Government of Alberta <http://www.energy.alberta.ca/Org/pdfs/EnergyEconomic.pdf>
at 6.
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net revenue payout the aggregate royalty payable equals the greater of the
gross royalty and the net royalty for the period in question.
Unlike the standard net -royalty and supplementary royalty structure
in the offshore area, in the case of Alberta oil sands projects, increases in
royalty rates are based on market price as opposed to discrete royalty tiers
with fixed rates at each tier (i.e., net royalty and supplementary royalty in
the HRA). Prior to an oil sands project reaching net revenue payout, the
gross royalty rate is indexed to the market price of a marker crude (WTI)
with an initial rate of one per cent (when "[WTI] is less than or equal
to US$55/bbl") up to a "maximum rate of nine per cent" ("when WTI
[is equal to or greater than] [US]$120/bbl") 5 ' Once an oil sands project
achieves net revenue payout, a net royalty is introduced, which ranges
from twenty five up to forty per cent of net revenue for the period. This
net royalty is also price-sensitive "when the price of WTI is less than or
equal to $55/bbl," the rate is twenty five per cent, and the rate increases
"linearly to a maximum of forty per cent when the price [of WTI is] $120/
bbl" or more. 2
In contrast, Alberta's conventional oil royalty regime does not
include a minimum or basic royalty rate, nor is achieving "payout" a
factor in determining the royalty rate. The royalty rates under Alberta's
conventional oil royalty regime, however, are also largely based on market
prices. With the exception of an initial five per cent royalty rate for new
wells, the royalty rate for conventional oil is based solely on market price
and well productivity. Currently, the minimum and maximum royalty rates
for conventional oil are zero per cent and forty per cent, respectively, and
these royalty rates are a composite of a price component and a volume
component. 3 The price component is based on formulas that use the "par
price" which is equal to the average wellhead price and set on a monthly
basis. This component can be a negative value, no lower than four per cent,
and has a maximum rate of thirty five per cent. The quantity component
is based on formulas that use the monthly production of a well in cubic
metres. This component can also be a negative value, no lower than twenty
eight per cent, and has a maximum rate of thirty per cent. Although the
composite royalty rate is based on the sum of the price component and
the quantity component, the combined royalty rate cannot exceed forty
per cent.
51. Canada's New West Partnership, Oil and Gas FiscalRegimes: Western CanadianProvinces and
Territories (Edmonton: Alberta Department of Energy, June 2011), online: Government of Alberta
<http://www.energy.alberta.ca /Tenure/pdfs/FISREG.pdf> at 30.
52. Ibidat31.
53. Ibid at 25.
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In comparing the royalty regimes in the offshore area with Alberta's
royalty regimes for both oil sands projects and conventional oil, both
jurisdictions have taken a broadly similar approach with the inclusion
of price-sensitive royalties in their respective royalty regimes, although
Alberta introduced such measures earlier and makes greater use of this
mechanic. The provinces differ, however, in their implementation of pricesensitive royalties. The standard royalty structure in the offshore area
includes discrete tiers of net royalty that are not price sensitive with an
additional royalty that is, while Alberta has essentially indexed all of its
royalty rates to market prices in one way or another. Despite this difference
in implementation, it is evident that both Newfoundland and Labrador
and Alberta, as significant oil producing jurisdictions, have taken steps
to deliver increased value to government while recognizing competing
objectives and allowing projects to remain profitable even during periods
of low prices.
2. Transportationcost eligibility
The original HRA prescribes four basic criteria that must be satisfied in
order for a cost or expense to be deductible for the purposes of calculating
royalties payable pursuant to the HRA. In general terms, the cost or expense
must be:
(i) an actual cash payment;
(ii) directly attributable to the Hibernia project;
(iii) reasonable in relation to the circumstances under which it is
incurred; and
(iv) charged to the joint account.
In addition to these basic criteria, there are a series of costs that are
specifically disqualified for deduction. A cost must satisfy the eligibility
criteria above and must not be disqualified in order to be deducted for the
purposes calculating royalties.
For capital and operating costs with respect to projects in the offshore
area, these eligibility criteria have remained essentially unchanged since
the executionof the original HRA. The Generic Royalty Regulations
reflect these principles and include provisions that are fundamentally the
same, although the Generic Royalty Regulations also include an explicit
prohibition with respect to any single cost being eligible for deduction with
respect to more than one project in the offshore area. 4 These provisions
of the Generic Royalty Regulations have not been significantly amended

54.

Generic Royalty Regulations,supranote 22, s 63(1).
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by way of any of the further agreements or regulations entered into or
promulgated by the Province with respect to Terra Nova, White Rose,
Hebron, or HSE. Consequently, all of the projects in the offshore area are
subject to the same general eligibility criteria with respect to capital and
operating costs incurred relating to the development of a project.
One obvious result of the eligibility criteria is that only cash costs are
eligible to be deducted. While we expect that most of the proponents of the
projects in the offshore area accrue costs for accounting purposes, for the
purposes of calculating royalties such accrued costs are not eligible. Only
once a cost has actually been incurred is a proponent entitled to deduct that
cost for the purposes of calculating royalties.
Another more substantive result of the eligibility criteria is that costs are
ring-fenced on a project-by-project basis. Pre-development, development
and operating costs incurred in respect of a project are only deductible
with respect to revenue generated from the sale of crude oil produced
from that project (or allocated to, and see Cost and Productionallocations
below for further discussion on this point). Many of the companies active
in the offshore area are participants in more than one project and are likely
incurring costs in respect of the development of a new project (such as
Hebron or HSE) while also generating revenue from existing projects
(such as Hibernia, Terra Nova, or White Rose). Notwithstanding, such
costs are not deductible in the current period against revenue from an
existing project but rather are included for the purposes of determining
when the tiers of net royalty or additional royalty may become payable
with respect to such new project.
In Alberta, both conventional and oil sands development is ringfenced in much the same manner. For conventional oil wells, once a well
is completed it is assigned a unique well identifier and is then recognized
as a separate and discrete "well event." Royalties are then calculated
with respect to each separate well event. 5 For oil sands development,
royalties are calculated with respect to a discrete project in fundamentally
the same manner as in the Newfoundland and Labrador offshore areacosts incurred in respect of a project are aggregated for the purposes of
determining if and when that project achieves net royalty payout. 6
While there may have been discussion between the Province and
industry participants regarding the elimination of the ring-fences around
projects in the offshore area as a possible way to incent increased

55.
56.

Petroleum Royalty Regulation,2009, Alta Reg 222/2008 [Petroleum Royalty Regulation,2009].
Oil Sands Royalty Regulation, 2009, Alta Reg 223/2008 [Oil Sands Royalty Regulation; 2009].
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exploration activities, only time will tell whether any such changes will be
implemented (and if so, how).
While the general cost eligibility criteria with respect to capital and
operating costs in the offshore area have remained largely unchanged for
more than twenty years, the cost eligibility criteria for transportation costs
have evolved quite significantly from the criteria included in the original
HRA.
Hibernia-TheSeeds of the DifficuIties
As .noted, the gross royalty on Hibernia is a percentage of the gross
revenue of a proponent. Gross revenue is basically the sale price of the
Hibernia crude sold after deducting certain transportation related charges.
Each of the net and supplementary royalties on Hibernia is only payable
after its specified payout has been reached and is based on net revenue,
which is calculated by deducting from gross revenue certain costs that are
eligible costs under the HRA. Transportation costs are thus fundamental
to the calculation of gross revenue and net revenue for the purposes of
determining the royalties payable under the HRA.
- The original HRA divided the Hibernia project into a resource project
(everything prior to delivery of Hibernia crude to tankers) and a tanker
project (the transportation of Hibernia crude in tankers beneficially owned
by the Hibernia proponents).57
While there is no obligation in the HRA for the Hibernia proponents
to' use a tanker project, the original HRA included detailed provisions
with respect to cost eligibility for costs associated with the use of a tanker
project to transport Hibernia crude to market. As originally envisioned,
the participating interest of each Hibernia proponent in the tanker project
would be the same as such proponent's participating interest in Hibernia,
with the likely result that each such proponent's costs in relation to the
tanker project would have closely approximated such proponent's use of
the tanker project's transportation assets. The tanker project would arrange
for sufficient transportation capacity to transport all Hibernia crude to the
transshipment facility to be constructed at Whiffen Head in Newfoundland
and Labrador and owned by Newfoundland Transhipment Ltd. (NTL).
Under the original HRA, the eligibility criteria for costs incurred with
respect to the tanker project were the same as the general eligibility criteria
for costs incurred with respect to the Hibernia project, except that the cost
had to be directly attributable to the tanker project.

57. See the definitions of "Project," "Resource Projects," and "Tanker Project" in Schedule "A" to
the HRA: ELRA, supra note 40.
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For better or for worse, there never was a tanker project for Hibernia.
The MT Kometik was purchased by a subset of the Hibernia proponents
and the MT Mattea was leased (pursuant to a long-term capital lease)
by the others, and the interest of any such proponent in such aggregate
transportation capacity is not necessarily equal to such proponent's
participating interest in the Hibernia project.
Although there was no obligation in the original HRA that the Hibernia
proponents have a tanker project, and the original HRA included provisions
for the calculation of non-tanker project transportation costs, determining
which provisions would be applicable to any particular transportation
costs would depend on whether the transportation services were provided
at arm's length to the relevant Hibernia proponent. The definition of arm's
length under the HRA specifies that a service provided between Hibernia
proponents or their affiliates will not be at arm's length. As each of the MT
Kometik and the MT Mattea were wholly-owned or leased by some the
Hibernia proponents (and the MT Vinland, on its arrival in the offshore
area shortly before commencement of production from Terra Nova, was
leased (among others) by the majority of the Hibernia proponents), almost
all use by the Hibernia proponents of these tankers to transport Hibernia
crude would be a non-arm's length transportation service under the HRA.
The end result is that, because of the actual ownership or chartering
of these tankers, there were issues as to the applicability of the carefully
negotiated provisions in the HRA relating to the deductibility of
transportation costs. Given the lack of a tanker project and the fact that NTL
was not acquired or operated by the resource project or a tanker project
(which was the assumed basis for eligible cost treatment of transhipment
costs under the HRA) for most of the producing life of Hibernia to date,
the Hibernia proponents and the Province disagreed as to the proper
calculation of eligible transportation costs. This disagreement was finally
settled in February 2010 as one part of the agreements relating to HSE.
Regional TransportationSystem
In anticipation of production from Terra Nova, tanker pooling arrangements
were entered into among most of the Hibernia and Terra Nova proponents
with respect to capacity in the tankers available to transport crude produced
from both projects. This pooling arrangement was not a contractual or
legislative change with respect to transportation costs that would be
eligible for royalty purposes, but it did affect the actual costs incurred by
the Hibernia and Terra Nova participants for transportation. Although this
pooling arrangement was not the first commercial arrangement relating
to transportation among organizations active in the offshore area (and
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in fact there were additional arrangements entered into during the term
of this pooling arrangement), it was the most expansive and significant
arrangement relating to transportation.
While the specific terms of this pooling arrangement are not particularly
relevant to (and are beyond the scope of) this paper, it is worth noting
that this pooling arrangement changed one of the fundamental aspects of
the cost structure that would have existed in respect of the tanker project.
Pursuant to the pooling arrangement, the costs of each participant in the
pooling arrangement were largely fixed and did not vary with the usage
made by any particular participant of the transportation assets included
in the pooling arrangement. Accordingly, there was a difficult calculation
required to determine what portion of the pooled costs were attributable
to particular voyages. The Province, not being a party to this pooling
arrangement, was concerned with the lack of transparency and its limited
understanding in relation to such transportation costs, and this concern
fuelled the disagreement over eligible transportation costs.
As discussed, the HRA has a number of general requirements for
eligible costs, including that they be charged to the joint account, and
has a number of disqualifications of costs that prevent such costs from
being deducted. The costs incurred in respect of transportation by a tanker
that is not part of the tanker project (and particularly the costs associated
with the tankers included within the pooling arrangement which included
proponents from multiple projects), and for transshipment costs in respect
of NTL, are not paid through the joint account. This was one more reason
why the issue about whether such costs would be deductible for the purpose
of calculating gross revenue continued as a matter of disagreement and
dispute between the Hibernia proponents from 1997 to 2010.
Anotherconcem for the Province in relation to transshipment costs
was the fact that NTL was owned by some of the proponents or their
affiliates and the costs established for NTL services include an element for
return on capital to the owners of NTL. The Province did not accept this,
despite the fact that the same fees were paid by any user of NTL, whether
arm's length or not, and could thus be justified as fair market value.
Terra Nova
Given the existing issues under the HRA, the transportation and
transshipment cost rules for Terra Nova were the subject of lengthy and
vigorous debate during negotiations among the Terra Nova proponents
and the Province. The Hibernia experience still rankled the Province; their
sense was that Terra Nova was the first of many new projects and they
evinced a desire to resolve some of the issues in a manner favourable to the
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Province from a royalty standpoint. As discussed above, the negotiations
between the Province and the Terra Nova proponents broke off and the
royalty regime for Terra Nova was ultimately promulgated by the Province
as the Generic Royalty Regulations. It can be speculated that a (not

insignificant) contributing factor to this cessation of negotiations was the
inability of the Province and the Terra Nova proponents to agree on the
proper treatment of transportation costs for royalty purposes. In the end,
however, the solution in Terra Nova did little to advance the resolution of
these issues. Section 70 of the Generic Royalty Regulations (applicable
to Terra Nova, White Rose and any other project subject to the generic
regime) provides that "[a]n estimate of the eligible transportation costs for
an interest holder for a period [would], after consultation with the interest
holder, be determined by the minister [who would] notify the interest
holder of [the] determination...before the beginning of th[at] period."58
The minister was also to provide the interest holder, before such interest
holder was required to file its annual reconciliation of royalty payments
under section 32 of the Generic Royalty Regulations, of the minister's

determination of the eligible transportation costs for the period.5 9
Misgivings have been expressed in other quarters about the result in
the Generic Royalty Regulations.6" The only publicly available assessment

of the efficacy of this process is in a report of the Auditor General of
Newfoundland and Labrador in January 2009 that states:
Terra Nova Project: Contrary to the requirements of the Royalty

Regulations, 2003 the Department has not, in consultation with the
project owners, developed any eligibility rules that would provide criteria
to be used in determining what constitutes an eligible transportation
cost. As a result, the Minister cannot provide the project owners with the
Minister's determination of eligible transportation costs in accordance
with the Regulations. The [seven] project owners have never provided
actual transportation cost information with their annual reconciliations.61

58. Supra note 22, s 70.
59. See the discussion of these provisions in Thrasher, supra note 21 at 374-376.
60. Ibid at 375 and 407.
61. Auditor General of Newfoundland and Labrador, Report of the Auditor General to the House
of Assembly on Reviews of Departments and Crown Agencies for the Year Ended 31 March 2008
(St. John's: Auditor General, January 2009) at Part 2.15, online: Office of the Auditor General of
Newfoundland and Labrador <http://www.ag.gov.nl.ca/ag/2008.htm> at 396. The Auditor General's
report also had similar comments on the situation in White Rose, where the transportation provisions
in section 70 of the Generic Royalty Regulations also applied.
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Hebron
The issues with respect to. the deductibility of transportation and
transshipment costs were still outstanding at the time of the Hebron
negotiations in 2007 and 2008. Like Hibernia, the development plan for
Hebron contemplates the use of a gravity base structure and, despite a
heavier quality of crude, would utilize similar tanker and transshipment
arrangements to those employed for Hibernia, Terra Nova, and White Rose.
Section 4.9 of the HFA contains certain agreements among the Province
and the proponents (including Nalcor as the holder of the Province's
equity interest in Hebron) with respect to transportation costs. In it the
parties agree that section 70 of the Generic Royalty Regulations will have
no application to oil produced from Hebron and that the transportation
principles set forth in Exhibit "E" of the HFA (the Hebron Transportation
Principles)are applicable to the royalty calculations under the HFA. The
parties also acknowledge that the Province intends to amend the Generic
Royalty Regulations to implement an eligible transportation cost system
for oil produced from Hebron. The Province agrees that the transportation
amendments applicable to Hebron oil will be consistent with the Hebron
Transportation Principles and that until those transportation amendments
are enacted the eligibility of transportation costs for Hebron oil will be
determined in accordance with the Hebron Transportation Principles.
The HFA also provides that once the transportation amendments
applicable to Hebron oil have been enacted, they will apply to the extent
they are consistent with the Hebron Transportation Principles and the
Hebron Transportation Principles will continue to apply with respect to
the interpretation of the transportation amendments. Disputes relating to
the Hebron Transportation Principles, the transportation amendments or
any inconsistencies between them may be referred to arbitration under the

HFA. 62

The key elements of the Hebron Transportation Principles are as
follows:
1. The general cost eligibility criteria under the Generic Royalty
Regulations apply to tanker costs and transshipment costs other
than the requirement that they not be a cost under another lease
and the requirement that they be paid by the operator and shared
among the interest holders in accordance with their working
interest in the lease.
2. Eligible tanker costs for an owned or a capital lease shuttle tanker
(one normally used to transport oil from the Hebron production
62.

HFA, supra note 36, s 10.1.
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3.

4.

5.

6.

facility to the NTL facility or direct to market) consist of operating
costs plus a ten per cent uplift, depreciation calculated on a
straight line basis over the remaining useful life of the tanker (not
a unit of production basis as in the HRA) with a one per cent uplift
on capital costs, and a return on capital of eight per cent on the
undepreciated capital cost balance, calculated at mid-year.
Eligible tanker costs for an operating lease for a shuttle tanker
resulting from a process with the required participation of arm's
length bidders will be the operating lease costs and tanker
operating costs directly related to operating the tanker, without
uplifts. If the process did not have the requisite participation of
arm's length bidders, or if the successful bidder was not at arm's
length and the minister determines the process was not adequate,
the eligible tanker costs will be determined in the same manner as
a capital lease unless the minister permits deduction of the actual
costs as allowed for an operating lease.
The annual cost of a tanker is allocated to the Hebron proponents
collectively based on the days the tanker is used in Hebron service
in relation to the total days the tanker is in service in the year. The
costs so allocated to Hebron will be allocated among the Hebron
proponents in accordance with an agreement containing specified
formulae and provided to the Province prior to first oil.
NTL costs are fully deductible, without uplifts, unless the
proponent paying them or its affiliate has an ownership interest
in NTL, in which case there is a formula to reduce the return on
capital component of the NTL costs.
Tanker costs for second leg tankers and replacement tankers are
actual costs in arm's length situations and the lesser of actual costs
and fair market value in non-arm's length situations.

The Hebron Transportation Principles represent a singular achievement
in resolving the transportation and transshipment cost disputes among the
proponents of the various projects in the offshore area and the Province
and were the basis for dealing with these issues in the context of HSE.
HSE
Transportation cost provisions based on the Hebron Transportation
Principles were included in the amendments to the HRA and in the ELRA
entered into in February 2010 in connection with HSE. The amendments to
the Hibernia transportation cost provisions in the HRA were made effective
1 July 2009 and the historic disagreement between the Province and the
Hibernia proponents regarding eligible transportation costs was resolved.
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The HSE transportation cost provisions are similar in certain respects to
the transportation cost eligibility criteria included in the original HRA,
but also differ in certain fundamental respects. The actual cost eligibility
criteria and categories of ineligible costs are fundamentally the samethe Hebron Transportation Principles were based on such provisions as
included in the GenericRoyalty Regulations, which were originally based
on such provisions as included in the original HRA, so there is now a high
degree of similarity among all royalty regimes in the offshore area with
respect to such provisions.
The HSE transportation cost provisions and the original HRA
differ significantly with respect to the calculation of depreciation that is
eligible for deduction in any given year and with respect to inter-project
transportation cost allocations. The original HRA contemplated that the
tankers included in a tanker project would be depreciated (for royalty
purposes) on a unit of production basis relative to the Hibernia proved
reserves. The entirety of such depreciation amount would be deductible in
relation to Hibernia other than the amount attributable to any days where
such tankers were actually used to transport crude oil from another project
(such as Terra Nova).
In contrast, the HSE transportation cost provisions provide that any
transportation assets used for the transportation of Hibernia crude oil are
to be depreciated (for royalty purposes) on a straight line basis over the
remaining useful life of such assets. For any given year, only that portion of
the depreciation for that year that is proportionate to (i) the number of days
(during that year) that such assets have been used for the transportation of
Hiberia crude oil relative to (ii) the total number of days (during that year)
that such assets have been used for the transportation of crude oil from
any project, will be deductible in relation to Hibernia. In addition, this
inter-project proration factor applies to almost all eligible transportation
costs incurred in relation to Hibernia, including any transportation costs
incurred with respect to any particular tankers that are used to transport
Hibernia crude oil.
While it may not seem like these amendments would have a
significant effect on royalties payable in relation to a project, they can
make a dramatic difference. The change with respect to calculation of
depreciation can significantly reduce the amount of depreciation that can
be deducted for royalty purposes in relation to a project in the early years
of such project when proved reserves remain low. Combine this with the
new requirement that depreciation be prorated among all projects that
make use of a transportation asset based on the relative usage of such asset
by such projects, rather than a single project (i.e., Hibernia) deducting all
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of such depreciation except for the amount attributable to the days actually
used by another project, and the amount of deductible depreciation can be
greatly reduced. The most significant reduction in depreciation also occurs
in the early years of a project, after significant pre-development costs have
been incurred but while proved reserves remain low and likely prior to full
scale production (and consequently revenue) being achieved. The longer
that revenue (net of deductible transportation costs) remains lower than
it might otherwise be (i.e., if more depreciation is deductible in relation
to tankers used in connection with the project), the payout balances that
determine the commencement of net royalty and supplementary royalty
grow more quickly as a function of the compound interest applied to
eligible costs when calculating such payout balances.
The transportation cost provisions implemented pursuant to HSE
attempt to more equally distribute eligible transportation costs (including
depreciation in relation to tankers) among projects in the offshore area
that make use of the relevant tankers. By allocating eligible transportation
costs among projects based on the use of tankers by the proponents of each
such project, these new transportation cost provisions attempt to align
royalty deductions with the use of the tankers, irrespective of the costs
actually incurred in relation to such assets by any particular organization.
Frustrated with the lack of transparency and understanding relating
to the actual transportation costs incurred by each of the proponents of
the different projects in the offshore area, the Province was ultimately.
successful in implementing (at least with respect to Hibernia and Hebron)
a system that allocates eligible transportation costs based on the use of
tankers, information that is more readily available to and more easily
understood by the Province than the (at times complicated) commercial
cost allocations among all of such proponents.
The treatment of transportation costs in the offshore area has
progressed from the standoff in Hibernia as a result of the facts not fitting
the anticipated tanker and transshipment arrangements dealt with in
the HRA, to a seemingly ill-fated attempt to have the minister and the
project proponents sort things out by a process of estimated and actual
transportation costs under the Generic Royalty Regulations applicable to
Terra Nova and White Rose, to a set of principles worked out in Hebron
and forming part of the HFA as a basis for resolution of the decade-old
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differences, to a sophisticated set of transportation cost and allocation
agreements in HSE that have put paid to the disputed items. 63
3.

Cost andproduction allocations

Hibernia
The allocation of costs and production between Hibernia and other
projects in the offshore area under the HRA is dealt with in several ways.
Costs relating to the acquisition or operation of facilities primarily for
the exploration, production or other specified activities in relation to
petroleum other than Hibernia crude or solution gas will not be eligible
costs in respect of Hibernia unless the Province agrees in writing. 64
Resource project assets may not be used for the processing or storage of
petroleum not produced pursuant to PLI001 unless the proponents and
the Province (after notice and full particulars from the proponents of the
proposed usage) have agreed as to the manner in which the revenues from
such processing or storage are to be taken into account for the purpose of
the HRA.

65

Aside from these provisions (which ultimately require future
agreement with the Province with respect to how to allocate costs between
projects), the HRA only includes a fairly general cost allocation mechanic.
Clause 29.4 of the HRA provides that where a cost is not entirely allocable
to Hibernia, only the amount of the cost which is reasonably allocable to
Hibernia will be potentially eligible for deduction. 66
TerraNova and White Rose
The Generic Royalty Regulations contain, in section 59, a more elaborate
set of rules for the allocation of costs between production licences issued
under the AccordActs than is provided for under the HRA. These provisions
look to the customary basis for the measurement of the capacity and usage
of the service or asset whose costs are being allocated. If it is either volume

63. Following completion of this article, in 2013 the Generic Royalty Regulations were amended
to add Part XI.I: TransportationCosts re: April 1, 1990 to November 30, 2001 Leases; NLR 35/13.
Part XI. I codifies definitional provisions for different categories of tankers, the general cost criteria
and the allocation of eligible transportation costs in respect of leases in the offshore area subject to
Part XI.1. The amendments incorporate the major elements of the variations described here, up to the
innovations of the HSE agreements.
64. See ELRA, supranote 40 at clause 17.2.
65. For allocation of pre-development costs see ibid at clause 28.1.
66. There are provisions in the HRA that provide, where the result of a transaction is to artificially
reduce the royalty share, or its value to the Province, for the calculation of "royalty share or [its]
value...as if...the [transaction] had not taken place," with a right to arbitrate the extent, if any, of such
reduction: ibid at clause 25.11.
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or days, those will apply to the allocation as well. If it is neither, it is to be
measured according to the industry practice for its measurement.67
If the cost to be allocated under the Generic Royalty Regulations is
for a capital asset as defined by Canadian generally accepted accounting
principles and good petroleum industry practices, the portion that can
qualify as an eligible capital cost is the product obtained when the cost is
multiplied by the percentage of expected use of the asset over the life of
the production licence.68
The Generic Royalty Regulations also provide, in a provision that
overrides any other provision of the regulations, that "[a] cost or part of a
cost that has been claimed, deducted or included by an interest holder in a
lease in [calculating] royalty share cannot be claimed, deducted or included
by that interest holder or [any other] interest holder in a calculation of
royalty under that or any other lease.69
Hebron
Under the HFA there are no modifications to the provisions of the Generic
Royalty Regulations referred to above for the purposes of their application
to Hebron. During the negotiations in respect of Hebron it was recognized
that, in the future, additional lands could be developed by way of a tieback to the Hebron facilities. Consequently, the HFA added provisions to
the Generic Royalty Regulations for the purpose of their application to
Hebron, to address cost allocations between an old lease and an adjacent
lease in the context of a tie-back to the Hebron facilities. A new section
59.1 provides that section 59 of the Generic Royalty Regulations does
not apply to transportation costs, to "old leases" (the lands described in
the HFA) or to adjacent leases (any lease "from which the interest holders
desire to utilize [any development] or infrastructure on the old leases"
(referred to as "existing infrastructure") "for the production, offloading...

67. Generic Royalty Regulations, supra note 22, s 59(2).
68. See ibid,s 59(3). If that percentage of expected use changes after the asset has been acquired, an
amount of incidental revenue or capital cost will accrue in the period of the change of use, depending
on whether the period is greater or less than the previously determined period of use. See also ibid,s
59(5).
69. Ibid, s 15. See the discussion of this in Thrasher, supranote 21 at 382. See also the P&NG Act,
supra note 5, s 37 where, in the opinion of the minister, the result ofan action, agreement, arrangement,
transaction or operation artificially or unduly reduces the amount of royalty share due to the Province,
the royalty share is calculated as if the action, agreement, arrangement, transaction or operation had
not occurred or had occurred at fair market value between parties dealing at arm's length. Subsection
'37(2) makes the minister's decision subject to arbitration under the Generic Royalty Regulations,
supra note 22.
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or storage of oil from [the] [a]djacent [l]ease)," which are dealt with
specifically in section 59.1.70
Where the interest holders of the old lease and adjacent lease are at
arm's length7' and they agree on the use of existing infrastructure by the
interest holders of the adjacent lease, the eligible costs incurred by the
holders of the old lease are eligible costs in the old lease and the revenue
or other cost recovery charged by the interest holders of the old lease to
the interest holders of the adjacent lease are incidental revenue in the old
lease.72 If the interest holders are not at arm's length, the minister has the
discretion to either treat the costs and revenues as provided for in arm's
length situations, if there is a collective request by the interest holders of
both leases and such treatment is satisfactory to the minister.73 If no such
request is received or the minister does not approve a request, eligible
capital costs incurred by the interest holders of the old lease for new capital
improvements to the existing infrastructure required to handle oil from the
adjacent lease are allocated between the two leases in proportion to their
reasonable estimated future benefit for each lease. Eligible operating costs
are allocated between the old lease and the new lease on the customary basis
used in the industry, as provided under the GenericRoyalty Regulations.74
There is a general provision added to the Generic Royalty Regulations
for the purpose of their application to Hebron that makes the eligibility
for royalty purposes of amounts actually charged by the interest holders
in respect of such eligible capital and operating costs and reasonable
capital recovery fees subject to review and revision by the minister if the
minister believes that eligibility of the amount charged will have the effect
of artificially increasing or decreasing royalties otherwise payable by the
holders of the old lease and the adjacent lease compared to what would
have occurred if the transaction was at arm's length.75 In such cases, the
minister may deem an alternative eligible amount for royalty calculation

70. See Generic Royalty Regulations,ibid,s 59.1 as added in Exhibit "C" of the HFA, supra note 36.
71. Under the Generic Royalty Regulations and the HFA "arm's length" has the meaning it has in s
251 of the Income Tax Act, RSC 1985 (5th Supp), c I with added provisions dealing with transactions
between interest holders or their affiliates along the lines of what was in the definition of "arm's
length" in HRA and a general discretionary power in the minister to determine things are not at arm's
length (see's 16(2)). Subsection 59.1 (b), added to the Generic Regulations applicable to Hebron by
the HFA, provides that the interest holders of the old lease and adjacent lease are at "arm's length" if
the interest holders of the old lease or their affiliates do not collectively hold a majority interest in the
adjacent lease.
72. See HFA, ibid, s 59.1(d).
73. See HFA, ibid, s 59.1(e)(i).
74. See Generic Royalty Regulations, supra note 22, s 59(2) and the fact that under s 59.1(a) such
eligible costs so allocated do not generate incidental revenue.
75. See HFA, supra note 36, s 59.1(e)(iii).
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purposes, subject to the right of the interest holders to dispute that deemed
amount.76
Finally, the provisions added to the Generic Royalty Regulations by
the HFA for the purposes of their application to Hebron also provide that
where the Province has promulgated regulations of general application
for the allocation of costs and revenues between leases, the Hebron
proponents collectively can elect, before first oil from an adjacent lease,
to use those rules for allocating costs and revenues between the old lease
and the adjacent lease. 7
HSE
In the context of the HSE negotiations, the approval by the C-NLOPB of an
amendment to the Hibernia development plan relating to the development
of the HSE Lands expressly contemplates the development and exploitation
of the HSE Lands by way of a subsea tie-back to the Hibernia GBS.71 As a
result, the Hibernia proponents and the Province recognized the need for
detailed provisions with respect to allocations between PL1001 and the
original Hibernia proponents on one hand and PLI005 and EL1093 and
the proponents in respect of HSE on the other hand.
Even though the original Hibernia proponents and the HSE
proponents are largely the same organizations, it is important to note
that the participating interests of the different proponents vary between
original Hibernia and HSE, particularly with the inclusion of Nalcor as
an equity interest holder in respect of the HSE Lands. While perhaps a
statement of the obvious, it is also important to note that crude produced
from the HSE Lands will be produced into the Hibernia GBS, and there
is no ability to segregate such crude from production from the remaining
portions of PL 1001 (the AA Blocks and the northern portion of PL 1001)
or to continuously measure any wells that are produced into the Hibernia
GBS.
As discussed above, there are now four distinct royalty regimes
operative in respect of Hibemia, inclusive of the HSE Lands: (i) the
original Hibernia project lands remain subject to the HRA; (ii) the AA
Blocks are subject to the HRA as well as an additional royalty; (iii) that
portion of the HSE Lands that is contained within PL1001 is subject to
the HRA as well as an additional royalty that is different and distinct from

76. See HFA, ibid, s 59.1(e)(iii).
77. See HFA, ibid at s 59.1(f).
78. See Respecting the Amendment to the Hibernia Development Plan (St. John's: CanadaNewfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board, 2010), online: Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador
Offshore Petroleum Board <http://www.cnlopb.nl.ca/news/pdfs/decO02e.pdf>.
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the additional royalty applicable to the AA Blocks; and (iv) that portion of
the HSE Lands that is contained in PLI005 and EL1093 are subject to the
ELRA, which includes its own additional royalty provisions.
The end result is that for Hibernia, inclusive of the HSE Lands, the
participating interest of each Hibemia proponent in crude oil produced
from the original Hibernia project lands and the AA Blocks is different
from the participating interest of each such proponent in crude oil produced
from the HSE Lands. Furthermore, the 'oyalty regime applicable to any
of such crude oil will be one of four regimes depending on where such
crude oil was produced from (original Hibernia project lands, AA Blocks,
HSE Lands within PL1001 or HSE Lands within PL1005, and EL1093).
Finally, in the absence of some form of allocation methodology, it would
be impossible to determine whether any particular barrel of crude oil
was produced from the original Hibernia project lands or the HSE Lands
contained in PL 1005 and EL 1093, or somewhere in between.
Given this level of complexity it was necessary to address not only
cost allocations between Hibernia and HSE but also production allocations
to allow the Hibernia and HSE proponents to accurately determine
their respective royalty obligations. Rather than including allocation
methodologies in both the HRA and ELRA, which provisions would have
had to be inter-connected from one agreement to the other as they both
would have related to the Hibernia gravity base structure, allocationprovisions with respect to all of these items were included in the separate
Hibernia Development Project Allocation Agreement (the Allocation
Agreement) entered into by the Province and the Hibernia proponents
(including Nalcor as the holder of the Province's equity interest in the
HSE Lands) on 16 February 2010.79 The specifics of the detailed allocation
provisions are beyond the scope of this paper, but a general discussion of
these provisions follows.
As a general principle, costs that are solely for the benefit of the original
Hibernia project lands or the AA Blocks (for the purposes of this discussion
relating to Hibernia and HSE allocations, referred to as "Hibernia North"),
on one side, or the HSE Lands, on the other side, are allocated entirely to

79. Hibernia, Hibernia Development Project Allocation Agreement (St. John's: Hibernia, 2010),
online: Department of Natural Resources <www.nr.gov.nl.ca/nr/energy/petroleum/ offshore/projects/
hibemia allocation agreement.pdf> [Allocation Agreement].
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Hibernia North or the HSE Lands, as applicable. 0 Operating costs related
to operations of common benefit to Hibernia North and the HSE Lands
(shared operating costs) are allocated between Hibernia North and the
HSE Lands on an annual basis based on the annual production from each
of Hibernia North and the HSE Lands relative to the aggregate production
from both (see below for further discussion with respect to production
allocations). While such shared costs will be allocated in the first instance
based on an annual production forecast prepared by HMDC, following
the end of each period there will be a reconciliation so that such costs are
ultimately allocated based on annual production volumes."s
Capital costs relating to capital improvements that will be of common
benefit to both Hibernia North and the HSE Lands (shared capital costs)
are allocated between Hibernia North and the HSE Lands based on the
estimated relative future benefit of the capital improvements to each such
area. The default for the purposes of determining such relative future
benefit is the remaining economically recoverable crude oil reserves in
each such area, as determined by HMDC in accordance with good oilfield
practice. Only with the agreement of all of the parties to the Allocation
Agreement, including the Province, can shared capital costs be allocated
on a basis other than pro rata in accordance with estimated remaining
economically recoverable crude oil reserves.82
With respect to production allocations, pursuant to the Allocation
Agreement, the total volume of crude oil produced into the Hibernia
GBS will be allocated between the original Hibernia project lands, the
AA Blocks and the HSE Lands on a well-by-well basis for each well
producing from such areas. Even though there is common ownership
of the original Hibernia project lands and the AA Blocks, because there
are different royalty regimes applicable to these areas, production is
separately allocated to these areas. The Hibernia facilities are not capable
of continuously metering each of the producing wells, but the well-flow
of each producing well is tested each month. The aggregate production
volume is then allocated back to each producing well based on the wellflow test results of each well in accordance with flow system, calculation

80. The allocation methodologies described in this section are those provided for under the HRA,
the ELRA, and*the Allocation Agreement and solely relate to allocations for royalty purposes. The
commercial cost and production allocations among the Hibernia and HSE proponents are provided for
under separate contractual agreements among such proponents to which the Province is not a party. As
this paper is focused on developments in royalties in the offshore area, such contractual arrangements
are beyond the scope of this paper.
81. See Allocation Agreement, supra note 78, clause 18.2(a).
82. Ibid at 18.2(b).
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and allocation procedures, which are required to be approved by the
C-NLOPB.
The preceding paragraphs describe, in general terms, how costs and
production are to be allocated between Hibernia North and the HSE Lands.
Costs and production allocated to Hibernia North are further allocated
among the Hibernia proponents in proportion to their participating interest
in Hibernia. As discussed above, however, the HSE Lands include lands
that underlie PL 1001, PL 1005 and EL 1093 and in which different Hibernia
and HSE proponents have different participating interests. That portion of
the HSE Lands that is contained within PL 1001 is part of Hibernia for
royalty purposes and the royalties in respect of such lands are governed
by the HRA, and that portion of the HSE Lands that is contained within
PL 1005 and EL 1093 is part of HSE for royalty purposes and the royalties
in respect of such lands are governed by the ELRA. Consequently, for all
costs and production allocated to the HSE Lands, it is also necessary to
allocate costs and production between the PL 1001 portion of the HSE
Lands and the PL1005 and EL1093 portion of the HSE Lands so that such
costs and production can ultimately be allocated to the individual Hibemia
and HSE proponents.
As required under the Accord Acts,83 because the HSE Lands underlie
PL1001, PLI005 and EL1093, the interest holders in such lands, the
Province and Canada entered into a unit agreement with respect to such
lands. As is customarily the case, pursuant to this unit agreement all unit
costs and production of unitized substances are allocated between PL 1001,
PLI005 and EL1093, which are recognized as separate tracts under this
unit agreement, in accordance with the tract participation ascribed to each
such tract. Within each such tract, such costs and production are allocated
to the interest holders of such tract in proportion to their respective
participating interest in such tract. These allocations made pursuant to this
unit agreement are adopted by the Allocation Agreement and are used for
the purposes of calculating royalties under the. HRA and the ELRA.
The end result of the allocation provisions discussed above is to
allocate all Hibernia and HSE costs and production among the Hibernia
and HSE proponents. Taken as a whole, the allocation provisions of
the Allocation Agreement mark a step-change in the level of detail and
complexity relative to that included in previous royalty regimes in the
offshore area -they are the first of their kind and remain unique in the
offshore area. If future development of the offshore area involves more
tie-backs to existing projects, then we would expect to see the royalty
83.

FederalAccord Act, supra note 2, s 167.
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regimes for such projects adopting similarly detailed and prescriptive
methodologies as the proponents of a project and the Province are all
keenly interested in making sure that each proponent is paying no more
and no less than its fair share of the royalty obligations associated with
that project.
4. Disputeresolution provisions
Hibernia
The HRA contains a dispute 'esolution provision with an arbitration code
based on the code contained in the CommercialArbitrationAct of Canada
(which is in turn based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration).' The arbitration code is set forth in a Schedule
to the HRA and clause 27.3 of the HRA provides certain agreements of the
parties with respect to the procedures under the code.85
Clause 27.1 of the HRA only allows arbitration of the matters specified
in the Agreement as being subject to arbitration that cannot be resolved by

84. Commercial Arbitration Act, RSC 1985, c 17, (2nd Supp). See the discussion of the federal Act
and the provincial equivalents in Claude R Thomson & Annie MK Finn, "International Commercial
Arbitration: A Canadian Perspective" (2002) 18:2 Arbitration International 205, online: <http://
adrchambersinternational.com/ publications.htm>. As Randy A Pepper observed: "The central
philosophy of the Model Law is one of party autonomy, the guiding principles of which can be
summarized as follows: (1) parties should be free to design the arbitral process as they see fit, but the
arbitral process should be 'fair' to both parties; (2) parties who enter into valid arbitration agreements
should be held to those agreements; (3) the arbitration tribunal should be neutral and as unbiased
as possible, and should be empowered to determine its own jurisdiction; (4) the arbitration should
proceed in confidence without substantial intervention by the courts; and (5) the resulting award
should be readily enforceable subject to review only on the basis of a limited and specified list of fatal
flaws in form or procedure." See Randy A Pepper, "Why Arbitrate: Ontario's Recent Experience with
Commercial Arbitration" (1998) 36 Osgoode Hall U 807 at 811-812 and authorities there referenced.
85. These deal with giving notice in accordance with the provisions of the HRA, the relevant court
being the Trial Division of the Supreme Court of Newfoundland or any court of appeal therefrom, the
number of arbitrators being 3, one arbitration for disputes common to all proponents except in special
circumstances such as sale price or revenues of a proponent, conduct of the arbitrations at St. John's,
English as the language, the use of the laws in effect in the Province at the time the dispute arose and
the authority of the arbitrator to decide ex aequo et bono or as an amiable compositor.
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discussions among the parties involved.86 It also postpones any right of
action in any judicial proceedings on any matter expressly allowed.to be
submitted to arbitration under the HRA until after the conclusion of any
arbitration or the expiration of the time within which the matter may be
submitted to arbitration under the HR.1.7 Key among the matters subject
to arbitration is the calculation of royalty share and any redetermination
or recalculation by the Province in relation to elements used in this
calculation.88
In recognition of its importance to the parties, there are detailed
provisions in the HRA on the process and available information and

86. These include the Province's determination of similar treatment or similar circumstances in
relation to its obligation to treat the proponents consistently under clause 6.2, whether the proponents'
lifting agreement would adversely affect any calculation under the HRA, Provincial approval of the
proponents' lifting agreement under clause 13.12, provisions to replace the joint account under clause
15.2, allocation to the production licence of the proceeds of any sale of the production licence and
other assets under clause 16.5, whether the costs and revenues of any transshipment facility are treated
consistently with other tanker project costs under the HRA as required by clause 17.5, the replacement
for the supplementary royalty index pursuant to clause 21.6, the form of provincial lifting agreement
(22.5), industry standard terms for the storage of royalty share taken in kind in transshipment facilities
of the tanker project under clause 22.6, information determined by ENR Canada to be replacement
information for unavailable or obsolete information required to determine the current oil price or the
deflated current oil price under clause 23.3, any recalculation or redetermination by the Province
of eligible costs or royalty share under clause 24.5, or any calculation by the Province in respect of
an artificial transaction under clause 25.11: supra note 15. Definitions in the HRA that have aspects
subject to arbitration include "Arm's Length" (on the Province's declaration, after discussion with the
proponents, that certain circumstances are not at arm's length), "Project Withdrawal" (whether there
has been a permanent and irrevocable decision, other than a Project Termination, by a proponent that
it will discontinue its obligations to the project) and "Sale Price" (its determination).
87. Under clause 27.1, the time limit on submitting a disagreement on an arbitrable matter is either
the time provided in the HRA, ibid, or, if no time is provided, within six months of a party having
received notice from another party that the disagreement cannot be resolved by discussions among the
affected parties.
88. Under clause 24.3 the Province has the right to redetermine any determination by a proponent
for the purposes of any calculations pursuant to the HRA, ibid, and to recalculate any amount of
any calculation or component of any calculation by a proponent of eligible costs, gross royalty, net
royalty, or supplementary royalty. Under clause 24.5, after payment by a proponent of any amount
resulting from such a recalculation or redetermination by the Province, a proponent can submit any
disagreement it has with any recalculation or redetermination by the Province to arbitration with
specified time limits.
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evidence on an arbitration in respect of the sale price for Hibernia Crude
under clause 24.5 of the HRA..19
Disputes under the HRA that are not subject to arbitration will be
determined by other procedures agreed to by the parties or failing that by
proceedings in the courts of the Province and all courts of appeal from
those courts, to which the parties attorn. 90 The HRA is governed by and
construed in accordance with the laws in force in the Province. 91
Terra Nova and White Rose
The Generic Royalty Regulations applicable to Terra Nova and White
Rose contain an arbitration provision in Part VI that also adopts as an
arbitration code the code set out in the Commercial Arbitration Act of
Canada. Subsection 48(2) makes the arbitration provisions in Part VI of
the Generic Royalty Regulations an arbitration agreement under the code
that prevails over the code in the event of any conflict.
Subsection 48(3) contains rules for the conduct of proceedings under
92
the arbitration code, along the lines of what was provided in the HRA.
Section 49 of the Generic Royalty Regulations provides for specific
matters that may be submitted to arbitration under Part VI. As in the case
of the HRA there is no general right to arbitrate issues under the Generic
Royalty Regulations. Things that may be subject to arbitration include
disputes with respect to the assessment or reassessment of royalty share,
the calculation or eligibility of a royalty cost, certified predevelopment

89. Article XXXVII of the ELRA, supra note 40, deals with crude oil valuations and begins with
the general statement in clause 37.1 that the sale price must reflect fair market value at the sale point
taking into account specified factors. Clause 37.2 requires that each monthly summary submitted by
a proponent to the Province include, for each sale price reported, the estimated landed price at the
sale point of at least two widely-traded reference crude oils, quality adjusted for Hibernia crude. The
Province can re-determine or recalculate the royalty share based upon the sale price reported by a
proponent not reflecting fair market value and if it does so it must provide the proponent, at the time
of the redetermination or recalculation, with an explanation of the reasons for doing so. The Province
does not have to disclose any confidential information received by the Province with respect to the
pricing of any other proponent, until the time of an arbitration pursuant to clause 24.5. For a much
more detailed reference price committee process developed for Terra Nova see s 81 of Part XIII of the
Generic Royalty Regulations, supranote 22 and the discussion in Thrasher, sdpra note 21 at 380-381.
There is apparently no publicly available information on the creation, composition or operation of the
reference price committee for Terra Nova.
90. ELRA, supra note 40, clause 38.2.
91. lbid, clause 38.1.
92. An important difference is that, unlike under the HRA, supra note 15, the arbitrators under the
Generic Royalty Regulations, supra note 22 do not have the authority to make an award ex aequo et
bono or as an amiable compositor. For a discussion of this concept see Leon Trakman, "Ex Aequo Et
Bono: De-Mystifying An Ancient Concept" (2008) 8 Chicago J Int'l L 621. In addition, the Minister
and the interest holders can also agree on fewer than three arbitrators under the regulations (see s 48(2)
(c)) and the parties can agree to hold the arbitration in a place in Newfoundland and Labrador other
than St. John's (see s 48 (2)(d)).
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costs, eligible transportation cost or incidental revenue, the calculation or
inclusion of incidental revenue or tanker incidental revenue, the allocation
of costs, fair market value, whether persons are dealing at arm's length, as
well as the other matters specified under the GenericRoyalty Regulations.9 3
Section 51 of the Generic Royalty Regulations contains a "baseball
arbitration" or "final offer" provision for determination of the sale price
for oil for royalty purposes in which the arbitrator is limited to awarding
"the position of the minister [or the interest holder] made in a specific offer
of settlement before the matter is referred to arbitration, as presented to the
arbitrator before the hearing."94
Hebron
The HFA contains certain variations, for the purposes of the Hebron
project, on the arbitration provisions in the GenericRoyalty Regulations.It
expressly permits arbitration under the HFA in respect of any matters that
could be arbitrated under the Generic Royalty Regulations, as modified
by the HFA. Such arbitration would be carried out pursuant to Part VI
of the Generic Royalty Regulations, unless the parties otherwise agreed.
The HFA does not modify any of the matters that are subject to arbitration
under the GenericRoyalty Regulationsbut adds several other matters that
could be arbitrated. 95
Any other matter under the HF can also be arbitrated except for
the specific items listed in section 10.1, which include provisions of the
Generic Royalty Regulations revised for the purposes of Hebron under
Exhibit "C" that are not subject to arbitration under the modified Generic

93. Other items subject to arbitration include disputes on the application of section 13, disputes
under section 37 of the Act (which deals with artificial transactions), the provision of records and
the extension of an audit period under s 45(2), specified decommissioning issues, the assessment of
fair market value of insurance under s 63(2), the approval of reservoir risk amounts as contemplated
under paragraph 68(l)(s), a determination of a "designated area" under paragraph 81(6)(b) and a
determination by the minister under section 19 of adjustments with respect to cbmmingled oil. For
Terra Nova, a dispute between the minister and an interest holder with respect to whether an eligible
cost is an eligible capital cost or an eligible operating cost may, before it is submitted to arbitration,
be sent to an independent expert (a public accountant) with a substantial presence in Newfoundland
and Labrador, on whose selection the parties must agree. See ss 86(1) and 49 of the Generic Royalty
Regulations,supra note 22.
94. Supra note 22, s 51(2). For some insights into the utility of such a provision see Charles
Rumbaugh, "Baseball Arbitration I", online: Superior Court of California, County of Santa Barbara
<http://www.sbcadre.org/articles/00IO.htm>.
95. These include whether measurement facilities and practices comply with the measurement
standards established under s 18 of the Generic Royalty Regulations, supra note 22 and the
reasonableness of the replacement for WTI selected by the minister under s 11.1(3) of the Generic
Royalty Regulations, as modified by the HFA.
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Royalty Regulations. They also include the provisions in sections 9.1 and
96
9.2 of the HFA on legislative and regulatory stability.
Section 10.2 of the HFA stipulates that if a dispute arises that involves
any issues common to both the Hebron Benefits Agreement (the Benefits
Agreement), which has its own detailed arbitration provisions, 97 and the
HFA there will be one arbitration of those disputes pursuant to the Benefits
Agreement and all of the provisions of the Benefits Agreement shall apply
98
to such arbitration.
Certain provisions were added to the arbitration procedural provisions
applicable to Hebron under the Generic Royalty Regulations as modified
by the HFA. These include a role under the arbitration provisions for the
ADR Institute of Canada (the Institute) or, if that body is not available,
a similar body with similar standing as agreed to by the parties99 and in
the appointment of arbitrators under the Generic Royalty Regulations as
modified by the HFA if the parties do not do so within a specified time. 100
The Institute is a non-profit organization that provides services in relation
to the development and promotion of dispute resolution services in Canada
and internationally.101
There are also a number of other provisions added in respect of
arbitrations under the Generic Royalty Regulations as modified by the
HFA. Decisions and awards by the arbitrators are determined by a majority
vote. 02 Parties to an arbitration are to agree in advance as to the rules
and procedures for the arbitration and, failing such agreement within a
specified period, the arbitrators adopt the rules and procedures established
by the Institute that apply to national matters, amended to be in compliance
with the Generic Royalty Regulations, and promptly commence and

96. Other topics that may not be arbitrated under the HFA, supra note 36, are the provisions dealing
with time limit
for development (s2.4), representations and warranties of the Province (s 3.6), predevelopment costs (s 4.7(A)), and the non-application to Nalcor Oil and Gas Inc of the provisions of
ss 8.2 (Separate Treatment) and 8.3 (Consistent Treatment) of the HFA.
97. The Hebron Benefits Agreement (St. John's: Hebron, 2008), online: Hebron Project <http://
www.hebronproject.com/media/219/finalexecutedbenefits.pdf> [Hebron Benefits Agreement],
98. The arbitration provisions under the Hebron Benefits Agreement are more detailed and along
the lines of what one would expect to see in a sophisticated commercial agreement: Hebron Benefits
Agreement, supra note 93, Art 8, Exhibit "B."
99. Where there is an agreed arbitrator appointment procedure and a party fails to act as required
under it or the parties are unable to reach an agreement expected of them under the procedure, a party
can request the Institute to take the necessary measure. See Article I l(4)(a) and (b) of the code.
100. See para 48(3)(i) added to the Generic Royalty Regulations, supra note 22, by Exhibit "C" of the
HFA, supra note 36.
101. For more information on the ADR Institute of Canada see online: <http://www.adrcanada.ca>.
102. See para 48(3)(i) added to the Generic Royalty Regulations, supra note 22, by Exhibit "C" of the
HFA, supranote 36.
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expeditiously conduct the arbitration proceedings.° 3 An arbitration award
is to be in writing, is binding on the parties and must deal with costs of the
arbitration and other related matters." 4 There is no appeal on the merits
from an arbitration award, and arbitrations conducted pursuant to the
Generic Royalty Regulations, as modified for Hebron by the HFA are the
final and exclusive forum for resolution of a dispute subject to arbitration,
but nothing prevents a party from applying to court on matters that are
subject to the jurisdiction of the courts under the Newfoundland and
5
Labrador ArbitrationAct.°
Finally, there are provisions added by the HFA to the Generic Royalty
Regulations for Hebron dealing with the recognition and enforcement of
arbitration awards, 106 excluding punitive or exemplary damages, 107 and
confirming the arbitrators have no jurisdiction to amend or vary the terms
of the HFA or the arbitration code.'08
The HSE fiscal agreements (the amended HRA, the ELRA and the
Allocation Agreement) all use the same arbitration code and related
procedural provisions as were in the original HRA but these are now found
in Schedule B of the Allocation Agreement. Each of the amended HRA
and the ELRA makes those provisions applicable to any disagreement
among the parties to it, as regards to any matter expressly allowed in that
agreement, to be submitted to arbitration and the Allocation Agreement
does the same with respect to any matter expressly allowed to be submitted
to arbitration under that agreement and the royalty agreements.
The development of the dispute resolution provisions in the offshore
area has moved from the initial adoption of the UNCITRAL-based
code under the Canadian Commercial Arbitration Act in Hibernia (now
applicable to all of the amended HRA, the ELRA and the Allocation
Agreement in relation to HSE) through a maintenance of the code in the
103. See s 50(4) added to the Generic Royalty Regulations,supranote 22, by Exhibit "C" of the HFA,
supranote 36.
104. See s 50(5) added to the Generic Royalty Regulations,supranote 22, by Exhibit "C" of the HFA,
supra note 36.
105. See s 50(6) added to the Generic Royalty Regulations, supra note 22, by Exhibit "C" of the
HFA, supra note 36. The relevant provisions of the Newfoundland and Labrador ArbitrationAct,
RSNL 1990, c A-14 for arbitrations under the Generic Royalty Regulations applicable to Hebron are s
13, which permits the court to remove an arbitrator who has misconducted himself and no award has
been provided, and s .14, which permits the court to set aside an award where it has been improperly
proceeded or the arbitrator has misconducted himself.
106. Sees 50(7) added to the Generic.Royalty Regulations, supranote 22, by Exhibit "C" of the HFA,
supranote 36.
107. Sees 50(8) added to the GenericRoyalty Regulations, supranote 22, by Exhibit "C "of the HFA,
supranote 36.
108. See s 50(9) added to the Generic Royalty Regulations,supra note 22, by Exhibit "C" of the HFA,
supranote 36.
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Generic Royalty Regulations with some additional features more common
in a commercial agreement arbitration provision and a final offer arbitration
process on price issues, to a much more commercially attuned set of
arbitration provisions in the HFA and the Generic Royalty Regulations
as modified by the HFA for the purpose of Hebron. The next step will
hopefully be a series of amendments to the Generic Royalty Regulations
that make these procedural and substantive improvements applicable to all
arbitrations under the Generic Royalty Regulations. The issues subject to
arbitration have expanded as well to the point where under the HFA they
now encompass virtually every issue relevant to economic value including
the calculation of royalty share and many other issues that arise under the
Generic Royalty Regulations and in relation to the additional royalty in
Hebron as well.
5. Legislative stability clauses
In a fiscal context, the purpose of a legislative stability clause is to give
the proponents some assurance that the fiscal arrangements reflected in
the agreements and the laws in effect at the time of entering into those
agreements will be maintained, or at least not altered to the prejudice of
those fiscal arrangements. This is important because the government party
to the fiscal agreements can unilaterally amend the economic bargain
reflected in the agreements and existing laws by changing those laws or
their application.
In Canada, given the nature of our parliamentary democracy, there are
at least two aspects to be considered in approaching such assurances when
dealing with the federal or a provincial government:
(i)

how far is the government party willing to go in providing such
assurances; and
(ii) how effective are those assurances, given the nature of the
parliamentary system.
The approach of Canadian courts to the capacity of a provincial
government to provide such assurances and the limitations on their effect
has been discussed in other contexts in relation to the offshore area. 0 9 The
key principles from the relevant authorities in Canada can be summarized
as follows:
1. A province has all the powers of a natural person to enter into a
contract.

109. See the discussion of this area in Denstedt & Thrasher, supra note 1 at 327-329. We acknowledge
the original research of our colleague Patrick Callaghan in relation to this portion of the paper.
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Neither a minister nor a province itself can restrict the ability of
the province to legislate in a manner inconsistent with a contract
entered into by the province.
If a province breaches its contract with a party (even where it
results from a proper exercise of its legislative authority) the
province will be liable to the party in damages, unless:
(a) the province, by clear and explicit legislation, denies the party
such damages, or
(b) the contract is unenforceable because it imposes an improper
restriction on the administrative authority conferred by a
statute on the province, or on someone representing the
province, such as a minister."10

On the last principle, a contract with a province may be unenforceable
if it could be breached by the proper exercise of discretionary authority
conferred by a statute. The potential liability for breach of the contract
constrains the exercise of the statutory authority intended to be exercised
only with regard to the public good.
As noted, stabilization clauses"' are intended to ensure that future
changes to the laws, regulations and their interpretations applicable to a
project in the offshore area at the time the fiscal agreements ate entered
into do not alter the agreements, and more specifically, the economic
bargain negotiated in the agreements as they apply under existing laws.
In other words, the agreement provisions, and the economic framework of
the contract reflected in legislation and regulations existing at the time of
entering into the project agreements, are "stabilized."

110. See PacificNationalInvestments Ltd v Victoria (City), 2000 SCC 64, 193 DLR (4th) 385; Happy
Adventure Sea Products (1991) Ltd v Newfoundland & Labrador(2006), 260 Nfld & PEIR 344 (Nfld
CA). For a general treatise on the Crown's liability in contract see Hogg & Monahan, supra note 15 at
333.
111. We acknowledge the assistance of our colleague Riyaz Dattu whose insights contributed to the
development of portions of this section of the paper.
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There have been a number of papers and studies on stability provisions
in international situations.12 A key consideration in the negotiation of such
provisions is what support can be found for the government's obligations
in the stability clause from sources other than the contract." 3 In the
offshore area, this could involve referring in the provision to relevant
treaties or other international obligations, which is complicated if the only
government party to the fiscal arrangements is the Province." 4
Another important consideration in the effectiveness of legislative
stability provisions is dispute resolution provisions in the contract that
allow the proponents to seek final resolution of claims for breaches of the
stability provisions in a forum or process consistent with international law
principles and free of claims of government or sovereign immunity.
Sovereign immunity in relation to the fiscal agreements relating to
the offshore area is dealt with in part by the Newfoundland and Labrador
ProceedingsAgainst the Crown Act (the PACA) which is intended to be
a complete code governing proceedings against the Crown in right of
Newfoundland and Labrador." 5

112. See Evaristus Oshionebo, "Stabilization Clauses in Natural Resource Extraction Contracts:
Legal, Economic and Social Implications for Developing Countries" (2010) 10 Asper Rev Int'l
Bus & Trade L 1; Andrea Shemberg, "Stabilization Clauses and Human Rights: A Research Project
Conducted for IFC and the United Nations Special Representative to the Secretary General on
Business and Human Rights" (11 March 2008), online: International Finance Corporation <http://
www.ifc.orglifcext/enviro.nsf/AttachmentsByTitle/pStabilization ClausesandHumanRights/$FILE/
Stabilization+Paper.pdf -; and Nana A Hackman, "Ghana's Oil Policy Debate: Stabilization Clauses
and the Freedom of Parliament To Impose New Taxes or Royalty," KITE (14 December 2009), online:
KITEonline
<http://kiteonline.net/index.php?optioncomcontent&view=article&id= 170:ghanasoil-policy-debate&catid=5: news-content&Itemid=5>. 'Each of these articles examine stabilization
clauses in the developing countries context but have discussions relevant in assessing the effect of
such clauses in any situation.
113. This would include such things as treaties, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
and other international trade agreements or arrangements.
114. The federal government has the authority to enter into international treaties or agreements,
such as NAFTA (see Library of Parliament, Canada's Approach to the Treaty-Making Process
by Laura Bamett (Ottawa: Parliamentary Information and Research Service, 2008) at I and
authorities referenced there, online: Parliament of Canada <http://www.parl.gc.ca/ Content/LOP/
ResearchPublications/prb0845-e.pdf>). Given the Province's experience with NAFTA in relation to
the Abitibi-Bowater matter (see, e.g., Alexandre Deslongchamps, "Canadato Pay AbitibiBowater
C$130 Million in Newfoundland Nafta Dispute," Bloomberg (24 August 2010), online: <http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-24/canada-to-pay-abitibibowater-c- 130-million-in-newfoundlandnafta-dispute.html>) and the NAFTA-based proceedings launched by ExxonMobil and Murphy Oil
in relation to the research and development guidelines of the C-NLOPB in relation to Hibernia and
Terra Nova (see Mobil Investments Canada Inc, "Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration
under NAFTA Chapter 11" (3 August 2007), online: NAFTA Claims <http://www.naftaclaims.com/
Disputes/Canada/Mobil/Mobil-Canada-NO.pdf>), it would not be surprising if the Province, as a
matter of policy, would resist explicit reference to NAFTA in a legislative stability provision.
115. ProceedingsAgainst the Crown Act, RSNL 1990, c P-26 [PACA]. See Hogg & Monahan, supra
note 15.
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The PACA does leave some remaining immunities of the provincial
Crown.116 The difficulty in trying to deal with these remaining immunities
in a contract with the Province is that it may not be possible for the Province
to waive them along the lines of a standard sovereign immunity clause." 7
In Hibernia, the legislative stability provisions focused on the general
legislative and regulatory framework applicable to the project and are
contained in the HiberniaDevelopment ProjectFrameworkAgreement to
which Newfoundland and Labrador, Canada and the Hibernia proponents
are parties. Clause 4.4 of the HiberniaFrameworkAgreement provides:
Canada and Newfoundland acknowledge that each of the Project
Owners relies upon the good faith of each of Canada and Newfoundland,
respectively, to maintain substantially the legislative and regulatory
framework applicable to the Project as of the date of Closing, to the extent
that doing so is in the public interest and, without limiting the generality of
the foregoing, is consistent with govermmental responsibilities, including
responsibility for ensuring proper management of its resources, the
protection and maintenance of public health and safety and protection
of the environment. Each of the Project Owners acknowledges that
Canada and Newfoundland rely upon the good faith of each of the
Project Owners, respectively, to carry out its undertakings in respect of

116. The PACA preserves Crown immunity in specific instances such as proceedings in respect of a
cause of action that is enforceable against a corporation or other agency owned or controlled by the
Crown (paragraph 3(2)(d)), relief in the form of injunctions or specific performance (s 15(1)), orders
for the recovery of property (s 16) and enforcement or execution proceedings to compel satisfaction
of a judgment debt (ss 20 and 24(1)). In many of these instances there are other remedies available.
Despite the Crown immunity for relief in the form of injunctions or specific performance, for example,
the PACA provides that the court may instead make an order declaring the rights of the parties (s
15(1)). Similarly, declaratory relief is available instead of an order against the Crown for the recovery
or delivery of property (s 16). Instead of enforcement and execution proceedings, the PACA imposes
on the Minister of Finance a statutory duty to pay out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund to the person
entitled to an amount under a court order for the payment of money by way of damages or otherwise
(s 23(4)). At bottom, however, there are situations in which the remaining immunities of the Crown
could represent a disadvantage to a person claiming against the Crown. For example, the bar of a
claim against the Crown for liabilities of a Crown corporation under paragraph 3(2)(d) may prejudice
a claimant where a piercing the corporate veil argument might have been available at common law.
In addition, a declaration is a form of final relief, and is not available on a interlocutory basis, as an
injunction couldbe.
117. See Hogg & Monahan, supra note 15 at 262, which is discussing estoppels but the result for
waiver should be the same. There is some authority that suggests that if a province were sued outside
the Province, the PACA would not apply (see Athabasca Chipevyan FirstNation v Canada, [2001]
AJ 609 (Alta CA)) and there could be a basis for arguing that a sovereign immunity waiver could be
effective as the immunity there would be the common law immunity of the Crown only, not one based
in statute.
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the Project as set forth in Article VII."

The restrictions on enforceability noted at the beginning of this section
must be taken into account in assessing the effect of a provision such as
clause 4.4 of the Hibernia Framework Agreement and the remedies in
respect of its breach.
Clause 4.4 is framed as an acknowledgment of a reliance interest in
relation to the good faith of the governments to maintain the legislative
and regulatory framework applicable to the project at the date of closing,
subject to the qualifications noted. If Canada or the Province introduced
legislative changes that were found to constitute a breach of Section
4.4 of the Hibernia Framework Agreement, and the legislation did not
expressly provide that the relevant Government was exempt from liability
for the breach, there could be a basis for seeking damages for the breach.
If Canada or the Province introduced regulatory changes in breach of
Section 4.4, there could be a basis for seeking damages for the breach if
the provision was not invalid for imposing an improper restriction on the
regulatory authority under which the changes were imposed.
To establish a breach of clause 4.4 on the basis of changes to the
legislative and regulatory framework would require that a proponent
demonstrate, on a balance of probabilities, that: (i) the changes involved a
failure to maintain substantially the legislative and regulatory framework
applicable to the project as of the date of closing; (ii) maintaining the
existing legislative and regulatory framework in the absence of the changes
would have been in the public interest; and (iii) maintaining the existing
legislative and regulatory framework in the absence of the changes would

118. Article V of the HiberniaFramevorkAgreement, entered into pursuant to s 3 of the Hibernia
Development ProjectAct, SC 1990, c 41, also contains specific provisions with respect to a proponent's
right to dispose of production from Hibernia in any domestic or international markets at the highest
available price, with a right to compensation if Canada or the Province restrict or prohibits such access
and a right to arbitrate aspects of determining such price. Clause 6.1 of the Hibernia Framework
Agreement states that each proponent is permitted to produce oil from the project at rates consistent
with good reservoir practices, subject to the actions of the C-NLOPB and the AccordActs. Clause 6.2
exempts the project from any production pro-rationing and from all other similar programs restricting
production of oil from the project.

Developments in Newfoundland and Labrador
Offshore Royalties: From Hibernia to Hebron and Back

81

have been consistent with governmental responsibilities including the
responsibilities enumerated in Section 4.4.119
Terra Nova

At the time of negotiation of the Terra Nova Royalty Agreement the
parties did contemplate provisions similar to those in- Hibernia relating
to legislative stability. The Province's Backgrounder on Terra Nova 20 in
its description of the Terra Nova Letter of Intent entered into among the
Province and the Terra Nova proponents on 5 August 1996 states:
Government is willing to provide a commitment to maintain substantially
the same legislative and regulatory framework applicable to the project
as of the effective date of the agreements, provided that this is in the
public interest and consistent with governmental responsibilities.

In the final analysis, with the Terra Nova royalty regime being implemented
by the Generic Royalty Regulations rather than private agreement, the
language on legislative stability does not appear to have found its way into
any publicly available agreement between the Terra Nova proponents and
the Province.

119. Although not relating to the offshore area, the Voisey s Bay Development Agreement between
the Province of Newfoundland and Labrador, (30 September 2002) contained a legislative stability
provision in Clause 6.6:
Legislative Framework
6.6.1 The Government represents to the Proponent (and acknowledges that the Proponent
is relying upon such representation) that it shall maintain substantially the Legislative
Framework for the duration of the Project, subject to legislative amendments contemplated
in this Agreement and legislation of general application.
The Government shall maintain the Legislative Framework consistent with this Agreement,
subject to Governmental responsibilities, including the responsibility for ensuring proper
management of the Province's resources, the protection and maintenance of public health
and safety and the protection of the environment. The Government acknowledges that this
Agreement is consistent with current public law and Governmental responsibilities.
6.6.2 The Proponent represents to the Government (and the- Proponent acknowledges that
the Government, in consideration of agreeing to maintain the Legislative Framework, has
relied upon such representation) that the Proponent shall perform its obligations set out in
this Agreement, the Instruments, the Exemption Orders, the Primary Production Order and
the Mining Lease.
The "Legislative Framework" is defined as "the Applicable Laws of the Province in existence as of the
date hereof applicable to the Project or any part thereof."
Here, the Province alone was giving the legislative stability assurances, they are framed as an
obligation rather than an acknowledgment, and there is no mention of a good faith element. The
language addresses the comfort relating to legislative stability in more definitive terms than those
found in Section 4.4 of the Hibernia Framework Agreement but is careful to qualify it by reference to
the obligations of the Province in its legislative and public policy role, albeit in narrower terms than
those applicable in Hibernia. See <http://www.nr.gov.nl.cs/nr/royalties/legal.pdf>.
120. See Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, "Terra Nova Development Project News
Release" (5 August 1996), online: <http://www.releases.gov.nl.ca/releases/1 996/exec/0805n03.htm>.
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White Rose and White Rose Expansion
We are not aware of any publicly available information on any legislative
stability provisions in relation to White Rose or the White Rose Expansion.
Hebron
As noted, Hebron utilized a combination of modifications to the Generic
Royalty Regulations as they existed on 16 August 2007, and the HFA
under section 33 of the P&NG Act, to fashion the royalty arrangements
for the project. This approach offered some interesting opportunities for
legislative stability provisions.
Rather than taking an approach along the lines of Clause 4.4 of the
HRA, Article 9 of the HFA, titled "Legislative and Regulatory Stability,"
states:
9.1

Royalty.

The Province hereby covenants that other than the royalty regime
imposed by the Royalty Regulations as modified by this Agreement, (a)
no other royalty shall be imposed on the Proponents in respect of oil
produced from the Lands; and (b) no additional tax, levy, fee or charge
shall be imposed by the Province solely on a Development Project or on
the Proponents solely in relation to their interest in the Lands.
9.2
Interests in the Lands.
Notwithstanding the Energy Plan, or any other policy, regulation or
legislation of the Province relating to energy resources, any working
interest participation by the Province, its agent, or any provincially
controlled corporation, in the Lands shall be limited to the interest
acquired by OilCo, its successors or permitted assigns, in accordance
with the Acquisition Agreement and the agreements to which OilCo,
its successors or permitted assigns, becomes a party pursuant to the
Acquisition Agreement. 2'
These provisions are not subject to arbitration under the HFA. 22 It is
interesting that paragraph 9.1 (a) is not limited to things imposed by the
Province whereas paragraph 9.1 (b) is.
The other legislative stability provisions in the HFA relate to a
combination of crystallization and modification of aspects of the Generic
Royalty Regulations and an agreement under section 33 of the P&NG Act
as follows:

121. HFA, supra note 36.
122. See ibid, ss 10.1(6), 10.1(7).
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1. The HFA provides that the Generic Royalty Regulations as-they
read on August 16, 2007, as modified by the HFA, would continue
to apply to the Hebron project, subject only to amendments to
z3
those regulations that were permitted by the HFA.
2., The revisions to the Generic Royalty Regulations resulting from
the negotiated Hebron royalty arrangements are set forth in
Exhibit "C" of the HFA.
3. Where a provision of the HFA is inconsistent with the Generic
Royalty Regulations or "any other regulation promulgated under
Part II of the P&NG Act the.. .provision of the [HFA].. .prevail[s]
24
to the extent necessary to give effect to the.. .provision."'
4. The Generic Royalty Regulations applicable on August 16, 2007,
as modified in their application to Hebron by the HFA, continue
to apply to the calculation of royalty payable by the proponents
on oil produced from Hebron, except to the extent expressly
permitted by specified sections of the HFA.125 Changes to certain
"provisions of the [Generic Royalty Regulations], as they existed
on August 16, 2007 that are identified as "'[C]rystallized' in
'Exhibit D"' to the Hebron FiscalAgreement do "not apply to the
[Hebron] proponents in respect of royalties payable on [Hebron]
oil" but changes to other provisions of those regulations identified
as "administrative" in Exhibit "D" would apply to Hebron "unless
the effect of a single amendment, or the net effect of more than
one amendment introduced [at the same time], [could] be [shown
by the Hebron] proponents to" exceed limits specified in the HFA
for increases in costs to the proponents collectively or royalty
26
revenues received by the Province. 1
The effect of this approach is to crystallize the Generic Royalty
Regulations applicable to Hebron, as modified by the HFA, except to the
extent of future amendments expressly permitted by the HFA. All of this

123. See ibid, s 4.4.
124. See ibid, s 4.1. Because s 33 is a "supremacy clause"--it contemplates the making of enforceable
agreements that are intended to be inconsistent with the royalty regulations under Part II of the
P&NG Act-what is referred to as the "cool and objective" appraisal should be applied in identifying
inconsistencies between the HFA and those royalty regulations. This approach finds an inconsistency
where the two provisions cannot sensibly be read together, or the operation of one. interferes with the
operation of the other. See PagnanSpA v Trades Ocean TransportationSA, [1987] 3 All ER 515 (CA);
Toronto Railway v Paget(1909), 42 SCR 488; and Tabernacle PermanentBuilding Society v Knight,
[1892] AC 298 (HL).
125. See HFA, supra note 36 at s 4.1.
126. See ibid, ss 4.3(B)(1) & 4.5. Disputes between the minister and the proponents as to the
application of these limits are subject to arbitration.
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is, of course, still subject to the restrictions on enforceability discussed at
the outset of this section. Despite this, it represents an interesting variation
on the more traditional approaches to legislative stability.
HSE
The amendments to the HRA resulting from the HSE agreements do not
contain any additional provisions on legislative stability applicable to
Hibernia. The HiberniaFrameworkAgreement continues to apply to the
Hibernia project.
The ELRA contains the following provision in clause 40.1 A:
40.1A Stability.
The Province acknowledges that each of the Project Owners relies upon
the good faith of the Province to maintain substantially the legislative
and regulatory framework applicable to the Resource Projects as of the
date of this Agreement, to the extent that doing so is in the public interest
and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, is consistent with
governmental responsibilities, including responsibility for ensuring
proper management of its resources, the protection and maintenance of
public health and safety and the protection of the environment. Each
of the Project Owners acknowledges that the Province relies upon the
good faith of each of the Project Owners, respectively, to carry out its
undertakings [in the Formal] Agreement[s]. 12"
This basically parallels the effect, insofar as the Province's obligations are
concerned, of clause 4.4 of the Hibernia Framework Agreement in relation
to Hibernia.
In the result, the provisions dealing with legislative stability in the
fiscal agreements relating to the offshore area have moved from a generic
acknowledgment based on the good faith obligations of the respective
governments party to the Hibernia Framework Agreement and qualified
by other broad obligations of those Governments to act in the public
interest, to the more precise obligations of the Province in the HFA with
respect to the royalty regime and the -acquisition of an interest in the
project in relation to Hebron and the crystallization of the Generic Royalty
Regulations as modified for the purpose of Hebron by the HFA. It is
unlikely that provisions such as are found in the HFA would ever become
part of the Generic Royalty Regulations but they do offer some guidance
for future projects in which private contracts or section 33 contracts or
their equivalent form a part of the royalty arrangements. All of these

127. ELRA, supra note 40 at 40.1A.
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provisions continue to be subject to the restrictions on enforceability noted
at the beginning of this section.
Conclusion
The offshore area has now seen six major developments for which royalty
terms have been established-Hibernia, Terra Nova, White Rose, Hebron,
the White Rose Expansion, and HSE.
The instruments containing the royalty rights of the Province have
changed-from private agreement, to generic regulation, to generic
regulation with a project specific addition, to a combination of generic
regulation and a section 33 agreement, to a section 33 agreement alone.
The structure of the royalty has changed as well-from a combination of
gradated basic royalty and two tiers of net royalty in Hibernia, Terra Nova
and White Rose, to that structure plus a price-triggered additional royalty
in Hebron, the White Rose Expansion and HSE, with a variation on the
trigger for the additional royalty in the AA Blocks development in the
original Hibernia lands.
Perhaps the most significant changes have been in the treatment of
transportation costs-from the tanker project cost of service and fair
market value approach under the HRA that the parties were unable to
implement effectively, to a seemingly unworkable process for ministerial
determination under the Generic Royalty Regulations applicable to Terra
Nova, White Rose, and the White Rose Extension, to a set of transportation
and transshipment cost principles in Hebron, to specific detailed
transportation and transshipment provisions in relation to HSE and the
28
codification of such provisions in the GenericRoyalty Regulations.1
Another feature of the royalty regimes that has had increased
prominence as project development has continued in the offshore area is
the provisions for allocation of costs between projects. Given the different
royalty instruments applicable to the various projects that followed
Hibernia in the offshore area and the fact that costs incurred in respect
of a number of items such as transportation and transshipment are shared
between several projects with different royalty rates and structures, the
need for a more refined and specific set of allocation provisions becomes
apparent. From general allocation language in the HRA, to more detailed
provisions in the generic regulations, to specific provisions in Hebron,
to an even more detailed and specific set of allocation arrangements in
relation to HSE, this aspect of the royalty regime has evolved accordingly.

128. See supra note 63, with regard to the 2013 amendments to the Generic Royalty Regulations
introduced following completion of this article.
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The dispute resolution rights of persons obligated to pay royalties
have also evolved-from the initial adoption of arbitration pursuant to the
UNCITRAL-based CommercialArbitration Code under the Commercial
Arbitration Act of Canada in Hibernia and the Generic Royalty
Regulations to further refinements on the scope and procedural incidents
of such a process in Hebron, all the while moving towards an approach
to the arbitration process more consistent with sophisticated commercial
agreements.
On legislative stability provisions, in some instances there has
been qualified general language with respect to the maintenance of the
applicable fiscal regime, in others silence on the topic of the legislative and
regulatory stability. In still other cases there have been specific assurances
relating to the negotiated royalties and equity interests and portions of the
royalty structure have been "fixed" or crystallized" by private agreement
that overrides the royalty regulations in the event of inconsistency.
The developments in relation to royalties in the offshore area have
seen increasing detail and innovation on some of these issues as the
parties seek to fashion workable regimes that will address their respective
concerns on determining a fair share for both sides, consistent with the
benefits the individual projects provide to the people of Newfoundland
and Labrador and the returns available to the proponents from their
investments. The addition of the Province's energy corporation as an
equity participant in Hebron, the White Rose Expansion and HSE projects
has taken the Province's participation in these projects to a new level. It
will be interesting to see whether this factor and the progress made in
addressing these issues in the agreements reached on Hebron and HSE aids
in resolving some of these issues under the Generic Royalty Regulations
and gives the solutions reached broader potential scope in application to
developments in the offshore area yet to come.

